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Introduction
Ot,m of the primary objectives of the trade reforms implemented in
the Philippines during the early 1980s was to adjust the trade
protection enj.oyed by domestic industries to more uniform levels.
These policy revisions were expected to decrease if not eliminate the
market distortions caused by the restrictive trade policies of the past
decades. Moreover, with the industrial climate becoming conducive
to both internal and external competition, improvements in the
productivity and international competitiveness of industries will be
attained (Kirkpatrick and Maharaj 1992). Successful implementation
of such policies, however, are conditioned by market-related and
institutional factors which are specific to the industry or which affect
all industries.
This paper focuses on the impact of the trade reforms on
performance, as measured by efficiency improvements, and
competitiveness Of the Shipbuilding and Ship Repair (SB/SR)
Industry (Philippine Standard Industrial Classification [PSIC] Codes
38412-38419) and its subsector, the Boatbuilding Industry (PSIC
Code 38411).Although the boatbuilding industry isa subsector of the
SB/SR industry, it is treated separately because of its export potentials
and the fact that it received less fiscal incentives than the SB/SR
sector. Since the successfulimplementation of these trade reforms and
other industrial policies are affected by market-related and
institutional factors, it becomes equally important that these elements
be identified in order to come up with the proper policy
recommendal:ions needed to neutralize or enhance the impact of these
factors. The :;tudy will also verify the hypothesis that exposure to
foreign competition will lead to improvements in industrial efficiency2 _1 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
via improved access to imported intermediate goods as well asin the
level of intra-industry competition. Better access to imported goods
will lessen production time, making the firms more productive,
which, in turn, enhances competitiveness.
Development of these industries are vital for the country's
economic advancement primarily due to their key roles in supporting
the shipping industry. The shipping industry accounts for
approximately 85 percent of the country's domestic and international
trade because of the nation's archipelagic configuration and the
underdeveloped aviation industry (Leverage International
[Consultants], Inc. 1991).The efficient transport of goods and services
across the various islandsthus requires a serviceable SB/SR. industry.
With the present domestic maritime fleet comprised of water vessels,
averaging 26 yeats in age, the sector_ development becomes critical.
Furthermore, growth of the sector becomes extremely vital if the
country desires to become an active member of the Asean Free Trade
Area '(AFTA).Other economic gainsinclude employment generation,
reduction in foreign exchange drainage from the importation of water
vessels and freight payments, and support in the advancement of
ancillary industries such asiron and steel. Growth of the boatbuilding
sector is significantdue to its foreign exchange-earning and
employment-generating potentials-
The next chapter reviews the body of theoretical and empirical
literature relating protection, market structure, and efficiency.Chapter
3 covers the conceptual framework used in the analysiswhile Chapter
4 details the methodology and defines the terms used in the study.
Chapter 5 discusses the current situation of the industry and the
government policies which have affected it. Chapter 6 shows and
explains the results of the analysis and highlights the factors which
may explain the industry's performance. Finally, Chapter 7




PAST studies covering the relationship between trade policy reforms
and industrial performance focus on how these policy changes lead to
reductions in market distortions inherent in restrictive trade regimes.
Protectionist policies may result in allocative inefficiencies by causing
the promoted sectors to be highly profitable and byshielding domestic
producers from competition which may lead to complacency on the
part of managers (X-inefftciency) (Tybout, De Melo, and Corbo
1991). Philippine studies focusing on efficiency and industrial policies
reveal that the "protection structure induced resource misallocation
by favoring tile inefficient industries over the efficient ones...,i.e., the
export-oriented sectors" (Bautista, Power et al. 1979). With trade
liberalization, increased import competition and reduced domestic
protection will result in a reduction of these inefficiencies.
The diverse literature on the linkages between more open trade
regimes and efficiency gains have been the subject of recent surveys in
the field (Havrylyshyn 1990, Kirkpatrick and Maharaj 1992, and
Tybout 1992). The literature review of Kirkpatrick and Maharaj
(1992) partly traces the theoretical evolution from the neoclassical
theory of gains from trade liberalization (via the 'import-discipline'
hypothesis) to the "new" trade theory which links industrial
organization :o international economics.What is currently known as
the 'new' traJe theory was developed by Helpman and Krugman
(1985), Dixit and Norman (1980), among others.They incorporated
in the analysis the assumptions of imperfect competition, increasing
returns to scale and product differentiation. Among their arguments
are that the economies ofscalewill lead to reductions in average costs
asthe market expands through trade and that incumbent oligopolistic4 ,,i Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
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firms will be forced to adopt competitive prices due to the threat of
entry (contestable markets' theory). However, these gains depend on
dema_adshifts accompanying trade liberalization and the nature of the
market structure, e.g., ease of entry and exit and the level of intra-
industry competition (Kirkpatrick and Maharaj 1992). Power (1986)
adds that the existence of barriers to importation and exportation also
play a significant role.Other segments of the argument emphasize the
role of research and development (P,.&D)in enhancing productivity
and contributing to public knowledge.
Havrylyshyn's survey disclosesthat empirical studies on developed
countries verify the hypothesis that import competition reduces
market power, but "weak and ambiguous" findings result from studies
on developing countries. He also finds that positive gains result from
studies which directly correlate measures of efficiency with trade
reforms (Nishimizu and Page 1982) and that time series country-
specific studies yield clearer results than cross-country comparisons.
Using the efficiency-frontier and domestic resource costs (DI_C)
methods, Page (1984) finds a significant relationship between
technical efficiency and economic performance. Hill and Kalirajan
(1991), using a modified version of Farrell's efficiency-frontier
methodology, identify export orientation and sources of finance,
among others, as closely associated with high levels of technical
efficiency, saying that "a policy of export promotion ... will have a
significant positive effect on efficiency as firms subject themselves to
the discipline of the international market place" (Hill and Kalirajan
1991).
But there are also studies which show skepticism over the
empff icalproo_ presented. Kirkpatrick and Maharaj (1992) assert that
the existing theories and empirical evidence supporting trade
liberalization are ambiguous and inconsistent. They claim that this
indeterminacy ste,_ from the uncertainty of the behavior of firms
toward the more open trade policies so that more research must be
made at the micro-level to determine how the firms actually respond
to the policy changes. They a,2_.that the reaction of firms will be
"conditioned" by the existing structure of the industry (Kirkpatrick
and Maharaj 1992). Page (1984), using data on small and large scaleShipbuilding/Repairand Boatbuilding Industry I=, 5
enterprises of four Indian manufacturing industries, asserts that there
is "little evidence of a systematic relationship between firm size and
technical efficiency." Rodrik (1992) further adds that current
empirical evidences are not as solid as some sectors claim since the
effects of other macroeconomic policies are not "disentangled" from
that of trade policies proper.
The empirical verifications of the trade liberalization-productivity
nexus in the Philippines include the firm-level studies of the
Philippine Institute for Development Studies-Tariff Commission
(PIDS-TC) on selected manufacturing industries.These studies reveal
that there are indeed efficiency gains from the relaxation of trade
policies and r.hatfurther tariff reforms and removal of quantitative
restrictions are required for the industries to gain comparative
advantage (_ecson 1992). They also recommend that government
should consider sector-specific factors like monopolies and the
existence of economies of scale in certain industries. Not much
emphasis, however, is placed on the industry-specific factors,
especially market structure-related variables, which may explain how
firms differ in their responsestoward the change in policies.
The study on Barriers to Entry (1992) by the Sycip,Gorres,Velayo
Inc. (SGV) identifies trade and industrial policies as having effectively
limited intra-industry competition in some manufacturing industries.
The study further assertsthat these policy-induced entry barriers have
also caused structural barriers, such asexcess capacity and limit pricing
through rate and price regulation (as in the case of the shipping
industry),which had negative effects on the efficiency ofsome sectors.
The report men recommends that 'reforms in the incentive policy
scheme, establishment of a central anti-trust authority, and overhaul
of the bureaucracy' must be the main components of a competitive
policy leading to productivity improvements (SGV 1992).
Numerous studies on the domestic SB/SR industry focus
particularly on the technical aspects of ship manufacturing and
drydocking (see Marina Technical Notes Series). Other reports delve
into the financial viability and future directions of these
manufacturing activities (International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development or IBRD 1980, Private Development Corporation of6 _1 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
the Philippines or PDCP 1972). A 1972 PDCP study on the
shipbuilding sector details the various problems facing the subsector
and the government policies affecting it.The 1990 "DBP Industrial
Restructuring Studies on the Shipping and Ship Repair Sector"
compiles firm-level data on the existing financial, material, and
human resources of the two sectors with the view of formulating
policies which will help improve efficiency and growth. Another
report on the shipbuilding and ship repair sector is presented in the
Board of Investments (BOI) Ten-YearDevelopmentPlanfor Shipbuilding,
Repairingand BreakingIndustry (Leverage International [Consultants]
Inc. 1990). The study gives an overview of the structure and
performance of the sector in _therecent past. It explains that the most
important entry and exit barriers for the sector are in the capital,
technology, and marketing. As to macroeconomic issues, the report
clarifies that the exchange rate fluctuations have the most pronounced
impact on the industry since 70 percent of its inputs are imported.
Finally, the report gives suggestions on the key issues which the
government should address if it decides to assistthe sector. The study,
however, fails to provide an assessment of the sector's intra-industry
level of competition. It is also interesting to note that the problems
described in the report are stillthe same difficulties which the industry
faced in the 1970s asdescribed in the 1972 PDCP report.
In:a similar vein, studies on the boatbuilding subsector have often
centered on the sector's financial viability arid future.1 A case study
published by the BOI shows thatthe problems faced by the industry
are also related to the problems of the SB/SR sector. In the product
guide on pleasure boats, the Bureau of ExportsTrade and Promotion
(13ETP)of the Department ofTrade and Industry (DTI) indicates that
the country has been able to penetrate the export market of the
United States for sail-propelled boats. Potential export markets are
also described in the guide report.
1. Among these include the unpublished thesis of C. Custodio (1992) and the
PDCP Study on Boatbuilding (1980).3
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Conceptual Framework
A rationale for trade liberalization, most especially in developing
countries, stems from the fact that there are inefficiencies in protected
economies. The literature on international trade describes explicitly
the numerous 'biases' in resource allocation resulting from tariffs,
exchange rate controls, and non=tariffbarriers (e.g.,quotas) which are
inherent in protectionist trade regimes (Krueger 1972). Basically,
inefficiencies result ascompetition from foreign firms is restricted and
as monopolistic power results when incumbent firms maintain excess
capacity. Although there have been gainsin pursuing inward-oriented
trade policies; many studies have shown that the costs far outweigh
the benefits. A logical consequence of the removal of these trade
barriers would then be improvements in welfare and productivity
performance.
INDUSTRIAL PBKFOP,MANCE
Industrial performance in this study considers efficiency
performance or productivity growth at both the firm/p.lant and
industry levels.Specifically,the analysisconcentrates on improvements
in productivity performance due to static efficiency and not
technological progress (dynamic).zStatic efficiency at the plant level
can also be further subdivided into (a) technicalq_iciencygains or
2. Microeconomic theory elucidates that efficiency can be analyzed using isoquants
and isocost lines.While static efficiency exemplifies the efficient use of resources
and managerial expertise which allows phnts or firms to reach the least-cost
isoquant, technological progress refersto movements in the least-cost isoquant.8 ,i Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
maximizing the plant;s output, given a particular mix of inputs and
technology; and (b) efficiency gains due to the use of the most
appropriate technique, given the production environment.
Another type is allocative efficiency, referring to the distribution of
factors of production into economic activities which will yield the
highest returns at undistorted relative prices. At the industry level,
aUocative efficiency can be illustrated by the gains in efficiency when
trade barriers are relaxed, leading to the movement of resources
toward the production of goods which are in line with the country's
comparative advantage.
To account for how the entire tariffsystem gives protection to an
industry, the effective protection rate (EP1L)framework is used.The
study employs two measures of efficiency: (a) domestic resource costs
(DRC) of foreign exchange; and b) the technical efficiency index
(TEI).The DRC is evaluated at shadow prices in order to account for
the distortions in product and factor markets inherent in developing
economies. Shadow prices are prices reflective of society's valuation
of goods.The TEl is based on the works of Farrel (1957) and Aigner,
LoveUand Schmidt (1977), and gives a measure of how far plants are
from the efficiency frontier. Since higher protection results in
inefficiencies, it is presumed that the sector with a low DRC (i.e.,
more efficient) will also have a low EPR.
MARKET STRUCTURE
/
Developments in econo_mictheory revealthat the impact of trade
liberalization on industrial performance is also influenced by the
existing industrial structure. This theory is based on the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm which asserts that certain
characteristics of the industry condition the behavior of the firms,
which then determines their performance within their respective
markets2 Structural elements and conditions, like the degree of
3. This relationship should not be treated asflowing onlyin one but rather in many
directions. As certain models suggest, the behavior of firms help shape the structure
of the industry (Lee 1984).Shipbuilding/Repairand.BoatbuildingIndustry I_ 9
domestic seller concentration, conditions of entry and exit, existence
of economies of scale,and the existence of multinational corporations
in the industry, will affect the productivity and efficiency of the firms
directly or affect them by way of altering the degree of competition
within the industry. Hence, any policy changes (e.g., trade policy
reforms) which affect these elements Will lead to changes in the
performance of the firms.
In particular, entry and exit conditions can determine whether
trade policy changes will be successful in promoting efficiency
improvements. In industries where barriers to entry and exit are very
high or very restrictive, it is theorized that incumbent firms will not
have any incentives to innovate or improve efficiency even if faced by
greater foreign competition. Policies such ascapacity-licensing, prior
operator and protection of investment rules (applied to the shipping
industry) have successfully limited the number of participants in the
industry.' Protectionist trade policies have been effective deterrents to
entry by way of limiting foreign competition. The existence of
structural barriers to entry (i.e., arising from the inherent nature of
the industry and actions of incumbents) such as absolute cost
advantages, capital requirements, access to distribution channels have
also limited entry into the industry,s
It is also theorized that industrial concentration will have
detrimental effects on the performance of the firms since a market
characterized by few sellers will not perform competitively so that
output will be limited and prices will not equal their opportunity
costs. Moreover, firms in concentrated industries respond differently
from their competitive counterparts in making price and output
adjustments in response to disturbances (Caves 1980). Albeit such
arguments have merits, the real issue is the cause of concentration. 6
4. See SGV study on Ban/ers to Entry for a listing of these rules.
5. A comprehensive discussion of these element3 arepresented inthe SGV study on
Barr/ersto Entry
6. l_odrik (1900) provides reasons for the high concentration in less developed
countries (LDCs).10 4 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
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Let us suppose that the concentration of the industry results from the
relative size of the domestic market in comparison with the minimum
efficient scale of the technology used in the industry.Then economies
of scale imply that an efficient industry will necessarily be a
concentrated one (SGV !992)" It can be qualified, however, that since
price is greater than marginal costsas output isrestricted, firms in the
industry exhibit inefficiencies in resource allocation even if they are
technically efficient. But if concentration results from direct
interventions by the government to promote and protect particular
industries, then the inefficiencies cited above may very well result,
and th.econcern becomes real.What is important then is to examine
the causes of concentration in the industry and whether the
performance of the firms reveal improvements or not.
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS
The concern for improvements in efficiency is actually related to
the need to become competitive in the marketplace. Competitiveness
is rooted on the theory of comparative advantage, which implies that
an economy should produce the goods and services which it can
produce efficiently relative to other goods and services. Exploitation
of this comparative advantage will then lead to the attainment of
'international competitiveness', the ability of firms to compete
without government interventions, in both domestic and foreign
markets.
Private profitability is implied by competitive advantage while
comparative advantage refers to social profitability. Because of market
distortions, comparative advantage differs from competitive
advantage. A firm or industry may be socially profitable but may not
exhibit competitive advantage because of such distortions. One such
distortion arises from an overvalued exchange rate which may
penalize exporters by lowering their "private" profits.
The most important factors leading to the achievement of
international competitiveness include productivity improvements and
government policies. Pack and Westphai (1986) argue thatShipbuilding/Repair and Boatbuilding Industry I_ 1 1
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technological effort will lead to substantial productivity gains_allowing
firms to become internationally competitive in production. Hence,
efforts must be made to enhance the acquisition of technology by
industries.
TRADE REFORMS, MARKET STIglJCTURE, AND PERFORMANCE
Trade protection, by increasing the prices of foreign products, will
increase profitability of domestic firms, thereby attr:/cting many
entrants into the industry.This eventually leads to the proliferation of
too many firms producing output at levels below the minimum
efficient scale (Kirkpatrick and Maharaj 1992). Hence, the absence of
foreign competition allowsdomestic firms to operate below efficient
scale (scale inefficiency) (P,odrik 1988). With more liberal trade
policies, market prices will go down, reducing the profitability of the
firms, and result in the exit of the inefficient producers.The remaining
firms will then produce at higher output levels,which means moving
down their average cost curves to coincide with the lover domestic
prices and at higher levels of productivity (Kirkpatrick and Maharaj
1992). ILodrik (1988), however, cautions that these will result only
under assumptions of free entry and exit and increasing returns to
scale.
Where exit and entry is problematic, the case for trade
liberalization will depend on the so-called import-discipline
hypothesis, which assertsthat the challenge brought about by foreign
competition will adversely affect the market power of producers,
making them change their production and pricing decisions=Increased
impOrts will force these firms to adopt new technologies which will
improve efficiency and minimize costs (Nishimizu and Page 1982).
Even if demand for domestic goods are restricted, the increased
Competition due to more liberal trade policies will induce an
improvement in production efficiency.An important variation _f,_his i
theory relevant to the current study is that entry barriers are also.
prevalent in the input fide, which effectively limit entry, especiallyfor
small firms which do not have the resources to acquire imported raw12 ,,_ Edwin GilQ.Mendoza
materials efficiently.With trade liberalization, imported raw materials
become accessible,leading to productivity improvements.
Another theory focuses on contestable markets where it is argued
that, even with high seller concentration (or existence of monopolists
or oligopolists), entry and exit barriers (perfect contestability) and
quantitative restrictions (Qtks) do not block imports, the incumbent
sellers will behave as perfect competitors because of the threat of
potential competition from imports (Lee 1984).
These gainsin trade liberalization will be affected by the structural
impediments to resource allocation. In situations where the importers
are also major sellers,an increase in imports only result in higher seller
concentration (Kirkpatrick and Maharaj 1992). The hypothesized
decline in profitability will not materialize if these sellers are able to
maintain the level ofdomestic prices, given the lower cost of imported
supplies. Collusive behavior between producers and importers will
not lead to the hypothesized efficiency gains theorized in the
preceding discussion. In short, the purported benefits from trade
liberalization will depend on how the incumbent firms will behave.
R.odrik (1988) points out that because of the indeterminacy of
oligopolistic market structures, the results will not be clear-cut.
A:; stated earlier, there are many determinants of the efficient
performance of the firms which may or may not be affected by trade
policy reforms. These include the forward and backward linkages of
the ir,dustry, which have remained underdeveloped due to financial
and technological constraints (e.g., the local iron and steel industry).
Although lower tariffrates may help the SB/SR. industry, this may not
be enough since the importation activities would require time and
financial considerations which may adversely affect the ability of the
firms to deliver their services or products and hence their
competitiveness.
Albeit demand for repair jobs is more than adequate, demand
conditions facing domestic shipbuilders and boat ,nanufacturers have
prevented them from exploiting the potential economies of scalefrom
•ship or boat construction. The limited domestic demand for ships
generally arise from domestic shipping policies which favor ship
importation than domestic production and the existence of alternativeShipbuilding/Repair andBoat:building IndusW I_ 13
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markets of ships.Furthermore, the geographic location of the country
also determines the activities of the shipyards with countries situated
in areas of gr,._wingtrade and commerce experiencing greater traffic
of water vesselsand thus, more shipbuilding or repair activities. As for
the boatyards, their products are designed to cater to certain segments
of the market which require special marketing activities. Another
factor which affects the competitiveness of domestic yards, but
somewhat unrelated to trade policy changes, is the nature of the
infrastructure services in the country.
All these factors will have a bearing on how trade policy reforms
will affect the performance of the industry. Basically,this paper will
show that the channels, through which trade policy reforms impact
on the industry's performance, are mainly through an improvement in
its access to non-substitutable imported material inputs and a
movement toward greater intra-industry competition. More






Mostof the observations employed in thisstudy were taken from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) 1983 and 1988 Census of Large
Establishments (i.e., plants employing more than fivepersons) (census
data) and the surveys of manufacturing firms belonging to the
shipbuilding, ship repair, and boatbuilding sectors for the years 1986
and 1991 (surveydata).Since the census data are gathered at the plant
level, it is possible that two observations may yield similar
characteristics if both plants were owned by the same firm.
Furthermore, the confidentiality clause in the NSO survey prevented.
the study group from identifying which plants were operational
during the two years.For the survey data,only SB/SR firms registered
with the Marina and boatbuilders belonging to the Boating Industries
Association oFthe Philippines (BIAP) were given questionnaires. Only
22 firms (20 SB/S1L and two boatbuilders) responded to the
questionnaires with 12 of these completely answered. An advantage
of this data set is that a comparison ofthe same set offirms for the two
years can be clone.
Other data were retrieved from the Marina Offices, BOI and
BETP-DTI.. PIDS, University of the Philippines School of
Economics (UPSE), National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), PDCP,
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) and Philippine
Shipbuilders and Repairers Association (Philsar).16 ,4 Edwin GitQ,Mendoza
PROTECTION MEASURES
As the primary measure of the structure of protection, the study
uses the EPR framework (MedaUa 1986). EPRs are estimated using
taxes, import mark-ups, and tariffs,since EPRs based on prices cannot
be computed due to insufficient data. EPR calculations consist of
identifying the tariff rates, sales taxes and mark-ups for the sectors'
products, and material inputs, and using these to estimate their
implicit tariff rates (Appendix 12).
ImplicitTariffs
Implicit tariffs measure the "proportional difference between
domestic prices and border prices of homogeneous goods" (Medalla
1986) due to the many instruments ofprotection.The general formula
is
T = (1+011+f(1 +m]- 1
where f = advance salestax which differed between domestic and
imported goods. (After 1986, the sales taxes for both
goods were made equal);
m = percentage mark-up applied to compute the advance
sales tax,f which was abolished after 1986;
t = representative tariff rate for the sector; and
T = implicittariffrate.
To come up with the representative tariff rates, the tariff rates for
the products are averaged. Ideally,weights based on the elasticities of
demand and supply for the goods in question should have been used,
but since these cannot be computed given the available data, simple
averaging is used for the tariff rates on outputs. Tariff rates for inputs
are weighted by their sharesin total production based on data obtained
from past technical studies (Leverage International [Consultants], Inc.
1990, Custodio 1992). These average tariff rates are then used to
compute for the implicit tariffs for outputs and inputs.Shipbuilding/Repair andBoatbuilding Industry _ 17
EffectiveProtectionRate (EPR)
The assumptions used by Medalla (1986) are applied in this paper,
namely: (a) fixed input coefficients; (b) infinite elasticity of foreign
supply of imports; (c) taxes for intermediate inputs credited against
the sales taxe:_on outputs; (d) exporters granted drawbacks on tariff
duties as well as taxes on their intermediate inputs; (e) intermediate
inputs generally imposed lower tariffs than outputs; and (0 effects of
non-tariffbarriers excluded.
Basically, the EPIk measures the proportionate increase in
domestic value added over free trade value added as a result of trade
protection 0]autista et al. 1979). This can be represented by the
formula:
EPR = J • 1+$i i 1+fi(1 +mi) - 1
PsiO/ A',i "Ao"
E +/rj - E -E
j 1+Ni , (1 +sl)(1+t_) i 1+Ti
where Pj(_ = Value of domestic output computed as
(P..Q / (1+ s)). P.Q. is the value of domestic sales,
ql J j aj..I
inclusive of domesuc sales tax, sj
E_ = value of exports ofproductj in pesos
A' = total domestic material inputs cost per annum
si = domestic salestax on material input i
A = total imported material inputs cost per year
= advance sales tax on imported material input i.
After 1986, this equalled the domestic sales tax for
the commodity.
mi = percentage mark-up applied to compute the
advance sales tax,f. This became zero after 1986.
N. = nominal protection rate ofproductj
J
t, = actual tariff rate on input i
T_ = implicit tariff rate on imported input i18 ,,q Edwin Gil Q, Mendoza
....................... , ....................... 0 .................. ,,
Note that the numeratorof the fraction represents domestic value
added with protection while the denominator represents free trade value
added .Value added is defined as the difference between the value of
production and the total cost of material inputs.
_due of domestic salesinclusive of sales taxes (PaQj) is calculated





where AFGI = ending inventory of finished goods less beginning
inventory of finished goods;
AWlPI = work-in-process ending inventory less work-in-
process beginning inventoryT;and
TR = total revenues from the sales of main products.
Because consumers are not entitled to tax credits, the excess of
domestic price over free trade price will include the advance sales tax
and the tariffs.Protection on output (Nj) is
t¢_ : (( !_+.t_) [1 +,.j)l) _ 1 (1 +,j)
where t. = tariffrate on productj;
= advance sales tax rate, which equalled sjafter 1986;
mj = mark-up rate; and
s -- salestax rate.
J
7. For 1,983, no data were available for the breakdown of inventories so that work-
in-process and finished goods inventories were computed by taking the ratios from
the 1988 dataset.Shipbuilding/Repairand BoatbuildingIndustry I_ 1 9
Taxes on locally sourced material inputs do not constitute
protection because users are given tax credits, implying that these
inputs will only be protected by tariffs.The deflator for such inputs
then becomes
(1+t)
The advance sales taxes and mark-ups are assumed to be
incorporated in the reported values of imported inputs.The relevant
deflator for imported inputs is then the implicit tariff rates, given by
I + T_ = (I + t,) [l +f_ (l + m, )]
where the subscript i represents inputs.
AverageImplicitTariff'Pates
Since phnts also export their products, the averageimplicittariffrates
they face isan averageof the tariff rates described above and the tariff
rate on exportables which is equivalent to zero.This is computed as:
AverageImplicitTariff'Rateon Output = DomesticValueof Output . 1
BorderValueofOutput
The same formula can be applied for inputs as well:
DomesticValueofInputs
AverageImplicitTariffRate on Inputs = - 1
BorderValueofInputs
Net EffectivetgotectionPates
The EPK formuh can also be modified to account for the
overvaluation or undervaluation of the exchange rate.The overvalued
currency perlalizes tradable goods while an undervalued currency2 0 ,11 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
protects them, so that the EPR needs to be adjusted for such
distortions (Bautista et. al 1979). The EPR net of the exchange rate
distortions can be computed as:
OER (1 + EPR)
NEPR = - 1
SER
where NEPR = net effective protection rate;
OER = official exchange rate; and
SER = shadow exchange rate.
Estimates of EPRs are done from the plant to the industry levels
using census data only since there were only a limited number of
observations for the survey data. Industry-level EPR estimates for
1986 and 1991, however, were made using the 1983 and 1988
industrial structure on the assumption that there were no big changes
in this structure during the 1983-1991 period.
Import Penetration Ratio (IPR)
As an indicator of the degree of penetration into the domestic
market by imports, the IPtk is calculated.The IPR measures the share
of imports in the sales of industry ifor the current year. Hence, •
Imports
IPR =
PjQj + Imports- Exports
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS
DomesticResourceCosts (DR C)
The DRC criterion, a measure of static efficiency, is a single-
period social cost-benefit indicator giving the domestic factor costs of
generating a unit bfvalue added at international prices (Bautista et al.Shipbuilding/Repair and Boatbuilding Industry II, 2 1
1979). When compared with the economy's shadow exchange rate
(SER) or the social value of foreign exchange, the DRC provides an
indication of the relative efficiency position of the firm or industry.A
positive DRC/SER less than or equal to one means the plant or
industry has a comparative advantage in its economic activities. A
DILC/SER greater than one implies that the price of foreign
exchange is lower than the social value of foreign exchange saved (or
earned) in producing the import-substitute (exportable good) and
thus, the plant or industry exhibits comparative disadvantage. As an
'ex post measure of the opportunity cost' incurred by the economy in
sustaining its import substitutes or exports, the DR.C can be a good
indicator of how the sectors' eftlciency performance changed when
the existing protection structure was altered (Bruno 1972).
Shadow prices are used because, in economies with distorted trade
structures such asin developing countries, market prices do not reflect
the true opportunity costs of goods and services_These distortions
arise because of market failures (e.g., monopolies and externalities)
and government policies (e.g.,foreign exchange controls). Specifically,
shadow prices of hbor, capital,and foreign exchange are required for
estimating DRCs.The shadow prices utilized in the study stem from
estimates ofpast studies (specificallyMedalla 1986).These are outlined
in Appendix 12.
The sectors under study are basically considered as import
substituting, although some firms from the survey were found to be
exporter_, particuhrly the large SB/SR firms which service foreign
ships and the boatbuilders.
The DRC estimation follows the methodology used by Bautista
et al. (1979), and the PIDS-TC series of industry studies? DRC
estimates are done for four years and the term currentyearwill refer to
any one of these: 1983, 1986, 1988, or 1991.
The varied production cost components are first expressed in
terms of their social opportunity costs, and then allocated into either
8. There were some changes which the study group made, however, with regards
to certain assumptiom. Details of fire methodology used will be presented in a
forthcoming Development Incentives Assessment (DIA) project volume.2,2 _1 Edwin Gil Q. M_ndoza
foreign or domestic (seeAppendix 12 for details).9It is assumed that
the domestic capital costs are reported inclusive of sales taxes,so the
taxes are netted out aswell. The foreign costs are then converted to
their world or border values by multiplying these with
1
O_.R * (1 + T)
where OER = official exchange rate for the current year; and
T = implicit tariff of the asset for the current year.
In caseswhere data are missing,the required imputations are made
as long as the other necessary data are available. Otherwise, the
observation is dropped.
Capital costs
Depreciation and interest costs comprise the total costs of capital
services contributed by the following: production machinery
equipment, transportation, buildings, other fixed assets, and
inventories.
Depreciationcosts. Estimates of the depreciation costs (D) of each
asset type (except inventories) are computed based on the depreciation
values (d) reported by the plants or firms,adjusted to reflect the actual
lifespan of the assets,inflation, and productivity change over time.
Actual economic lifespans (n) of the assets are obtained from the
Bulletin "F'! tables and the ds are deflated by the factor 1.5 since the
actual economic life of these assetsare longer than what is reported by
the firms. To adjust for inflation, the ds are multiplied by the price
9. The allocation for domestic or foreign costs basically considers the perceived
actual conditions during the period of study, e.g., the source of financing of the
firms. For the survey data, the firms were able to provide some data on how the
costs were allocated. Whenever given, the allocation ratios for capital costs using
survey data were based on the source of financing of the firms.Shipbuilding/Repair and Boatbuilding Industry I_ 2 3
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index ratio (PILL)which is calculated by dividingthe price index of
that asset type for the current year with the price index during the
asset'syear of acquisition (seeAppendix 13 for the list of price indices
for each asset type).1°The ds are also deflated by the factor 1.03*to
reflect the assets' annual productivity change, since the study assumes
that capital assetsof anewer vintage embody higher productivity. The
superscript k represents the age of the assets as reported by the firms,
and thus, the factor also accounts for the assets' aging process which
affects their productivity.*l
Interestcost. The interest costs for asset a (IC) equals i * RC
where iis the interest rate for the current year (Appendix 12). RC is
the replacement cost of the asset a which is the estimated cost of
•replicating the entire fixed asset of agiven quality during the current
year.This iscomputed depending on the availableinformation. In the
survey data, the reported replacement .costs are used whenever
available. Otherwise, these are calculated as follows:
(.*a) *VIR
RC= 1.03k
where the variables are similarly defined in the preceding discussion.
Inventories
An average level of inventories (i.e.,working capital and material
input inventories [WC]) for the current year is first computed by
averaging the beginning and ending inventories of the outputs and
10. The year when the asset was acquired was determined by subtracting the asset
age, k, fi'om the current year.
11. Age of asset, k, is computed as:
where bv = book value of the asset
n = actual economic life of the asset
d = depreciation costs for the current year.24 ,I Edwin Gil Q, Mendoza
input.,_,respectively. Interest costs are then calculated by multiplying
the average level of inventory with the shadow interest rate for the
year.Thus,
wc =i•[.5E(FG _,, +FG ,,_) +.S }2( Wm b,, ￿Win,.,) +.SE( M1b,, +MZ,,.,) ]
] J J
where i = current year's interest rate;
FG = finished goods inventory;
WIP = inventory ofwork-in-process goods;
MI = inventory of material inputs;
beg = subscript meaning beginning; and
end = subscript meaning ending.
Land costs
These costs are only used for the survey data since the census data
do not have the necessary data for calculating this particular asset.
Interest costs accruing from land ownership is calculated by
multiplying the market value of land with the market interest rate of
this asset (10 percent).
Border value of output
The figure used corresponds to the value of output for the current
"period, computed in a similar manner as in the EPI_ equation. The
domestic sales (P_jQ_ and export (E:,)components are however




Border value of exports (BVX) isderived by deflating E_(alsofrom the
EPR equation) by the OER for the current period.Shipbuilding/Repairand Boa_buildingindustry I_ 2 5
World value of output (W) can then be expressed as
W = ,XBVX+ BVDS
./
Laborcos_
The costs of labor services are divided into wages and benefits for
unskilled labor, skilled labor, and family members. Since the census
data do not indicate the number of unskilled workers, it is assumed to
be 5 percent of the total workforce (TW).
The shad._wwage rate (SWj) of unskilled workers is assumed to
be 60 percent of the minimum wage rate) =The market wage rates of
skilled workers (SWI) are taken to reflect the social productivity of
their services so that no adjustments are required. Their wages are
computed by subtracting SSS benefits and wages of unskilled workers
from the reported total compensation of all workers. The shadow
wage of working owners (SW=) is obtained by applying the average
wage rate of skilled workers on the number of work-owners.
Total domestic labor costsis then given by:
SW,t = SW_ + sw_ +SW=
Foreign 1.'tborcosts (SWfl) arise whenever foreign consultants and
technical personnel visit local yards. These costs do not require
adjustments.
Material inputs and other costs
Materialinputs. The required figures for the raw and intermediate
materials (hereon referred to as material inputs) are the value of
material inputs actually used during the year. The domestic
component of the material inputs (MI) isdivided into tw6 equal parts.
12. These factors were estimated in past studies (seeMedalla 1986). See Appendix
12 for the respective factors applicable for each period under study.26 4 Edwin GilQ.Mendoza
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The firstis divided by the implicit tarifff0r that input and multiplied
by the ratio of the shadow exchange rate (SEK) over the official
exchange rate (OER). The second is deflated by the sales tax.
Domestic MI is thus computed as:
dora Mli*.5 * SER dora MIi,.5 3/11
where doraM/_ = domestically sourced material input i which is
calculated as a percentage of the total value of
material inputs (Appendix 12);
T, = implicit tariffrate on input i;
si = sales tax on material input i;
This means that producers areable to avail of tax credits for their
material inputs so that value of domestic inputs are deflated by sales
taxes.
Imported orforeign material inputs (FMI)is given by:
for MI,
OER*(I +TI)
where for MI_ = imported material input i;and
T_ = implicit tariffon the material input i.
Other costs. Other domestic costs (ODC)include light, water,
and other utilities (seeAppendix 12 for a detailed list).Their shadow
valuesare computed by simply deflatingthe reported values with the
zppropriatedomestic sales taxes.
Other costs include costsof industrial and non-industrial services
done byother enterprisesandsubsidiesreceivedbythe firmsorplants.
Since no appropriate tax deflatorswere included here, these valuesare
included in the domestic component of costsas reported by the firms
or plants.Shipbuilding/Repair andBoatbuilding Industry I_ 27
Other foreign costs (OFC) include licensing fees, dividends on
foreign shares, packaging materials, fuels, and lubricants. These are




OER *(1 + T)
wherefor OC = foreign component of other production costs;and
T = implicit tariffs for other foreign costs.TM
Domestic resource costsformula (at shadow prices)
Having enumerated the various costs and output components, we
now combine these equations to come up with the DRC equation in
detail. DILCs are computed at the firm or plant to the sector levels
and the expanded form is given by:
rx-_ Da,_+r.._lC,_ x--,dMl_ ,r.-, dMii SER _ doraOC .. . ]
IZ-,_. _ z, _. * 2_, _. ,+ 2_,, _ *_--+L, T -- * a_,,u +%+OOCl
oRc_=_' ° _ " ° ' ' " ' '+" Y'_" "" /
(.,-[±(v:.1-- .,.,...r:o, ,,'-- .r:o, ' )])
k [OERt_""l+r_ _, "l+r, " T l+r, _ l+r,)j)
where
Domestic Costs Components
D_ = domestic depreciation costs for each asset a
IC_ = domestic interest costs for each asset a
La_ = interest costs ofhnd
SW, u = domestic hbor costs
DMI_ = costs of domestic material input i multiplied by .5
13. Implicittarit_werealsotakenfromtheestimates madeinpaststudies(Medalh
1986).28 ,11 Edwin GilQ.Mendoza
dom OC = other domestic costs, including utilities such as water,
electricity, and other utilities subjected to domestic
sales taxes
ODC = other domestic costs not subjected to sales taxes
s = sales tax applicable for each cost component for the
current year
W = border value ofoutput
Foreign Costs Components
D__ -- foreign depreciation costs for each asset a
IC_ = foreign interest costs for each asset a
SW¢ = foreign labor costs
for M/_ = costs of foreign material input i
for OC = other foreign costs
T = implicit tariff rate for each foreign cost item
While plant and industry DtLCs are computed using census data,
only flrm-level DRCs are computed using survey data. Sensitivity to
changes in the interest costs components are analyzed using two
interest rates: 10 and 12 percent.
Domestic resource costs at market prices (DRCM)
The DR.C formula can also be used to measure the competitive
advantageof particular firms by converting the shadow values of the
numerator in the DRCs equation to their market values.This yields
the equation:
w- oE_[o _I*L 1.r, , 1.r,Shipbuilding/Repairand BoatbuildingIndustry p 2 9
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Competitive advantage can be determined by comparing the
computed DtLCm with the OER. If the ratio yields a positive value
lessthan or equal to one (greater than one), the firm or industry issaid
to have competitive advantage (disadvantage).
Owing to computational errors, we include in the definition of
firms having competitive advantage those which have positive
DKCm/OER. less than or equal to 1.2 and firms with comparative
advantage those which have positive DRCs/SER lessthan or equal to
1.2.
Technical EfficiencyIndex
Another measure of efficiency is the Technical Efficiency Index
(TEl) which can be defined as actual output overpotential output.
Estimation of the (best practice) production frontier is thus required
to measure the relative productive efficiency of the firms. Following
the methodologies of FarreU(1957) and Aigner, LoveU,and Schmidt
(1977), we first define a production function as
, = f,cx,,x2,..xj =,
where Y_" = maximum potential output of firm i;
X = material inputs used by firm i;and
z_ = error or disturbance term.
This function describes the maximum feasible output a firm can
produce, and thus defines the efficiency frontier. If fii:m i fails to
produce the maximum output, then it is considered technically
inefficient and this inefIiciency is reflected in the error term z. As
explained in Chapter 3, technical inefficiency can be caused byseveral
variables, some of them not quantifiable, and it is assumed that these
are captured by the error term.
To derive the TEl, we specify a translog production function and
use linear programming to minimize the sum of the deviations from
the frontier subject to the qualifications that all observations are
situated on or below it. Page (1984) callsthis a'deterministic' frontier,3 0 ,11 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
since it attributes the variation of actual output from potential output
as due to technical inefficiency.1_
Plant and sectorTEI's are computed for the SB/SP,, sector census
data only since the lack of observations from both the boatbuilding
industry and survey data may influence the estimates.
The linear programming model is specified by :
Minimize Y - Y,
Y = ao+ aLInL + aKIn K + aMInM + ct_ InLln K
+ ctLuln L ln M + Ctr_InK lnM + 1/2 au, (InL)z
+ 1/2 err, x (InK)2 + 1/2 aMM(InM)2
subject to:
(1) aL+ar+aM=l
(2) a_'+ a_ + at,, = 0
(3) arL + ar._ + a_ = O
(4) aML + %_:+ a,_ =0
(5) a,, _< 0
(6) a_ _< o
(7) aMM _< 0
where
Y = estimated potential output;
Y = value of actual output;
L = total man-hours;
K = capital costs valued at market prices; and
M = cost of material inputs.
The difference between potential outputY and actual outputY is
the error term. This is specified to have a negative expectation to
reflect the existence of inefficiency.The closer the derived TEl is to
14. This is a major weakness of this particular specification, requiring wariness in
the interpretation of the results.Shilobuilding/Ret)aJr and BoatbuildingInduslry i_ 3 1
one, the nearer the plant is to the frontier, and hence the more
effcient it is.The criterion that plant TE'rs in the 75 to 100 range
constitutes technical efficiency isfollowed here.
PartialProductivityand Factor-Intensity Indicators
Factor intemity
The capital-labor (K/L) ratio measures the capital intensity of
domestic production in a given year. It is constructed by adding the
rephcement costs ofproduction machinery and equipment, buildings,
and transport equipment, then deflating it by the appropriate price
index for the current year.The denominator L refers to the actual
number of workers for the current year.
The data tbr total employment for 1983 is obtained bysubtracting
homeworkers from the total employees.The figure for 1988 isalready
adjusted for homeworkers.
Factor productivity
Partial factor productivities are given by the ratio of census value-
added (CVA) to the number of workers (CVA/L) to indicate labor
productivity; and census value-added over the replacement costs of
capital (CVA/K) to indicate capital productivity. K and L are defined
similarly _/bovewhile CVA iscomputed asvalue of output, minus the
total of cost of raw material inputs, supplies,fuels,electricity, contract
work, industrial services done by others, and goods for resale. It is
then deflated by the gross national product (GNP) deflator for the
current year to adjust for inflation.
Other partial productivity measuresincluded in the study are value
of output per capital (VO/K) and value of output per worker (VO/L).
Output values (3/0) are deflated by the GNP deflator for the current
years.3 2 ,11 Edwin Gil Q, Mendoza
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MAILK_T STRUCTURE INDICATORSAND PROFITABILITYMEASURES
All measures described here are computed at the plant and
industry levels.
Concentration Ratios
Two measures of concentration are computed, 4_Plant
Concentration Ratio (CtL-4) and the Herfindahl Index (HI). The
CR-4 measures the total shares of the four largest plants in the sector
in terms of value-added and product sales.On the other hand, the HI
gives an indication of how dispersed the plants are within an industry.
It isdefined asthe sum of the squares of the market shares of allplants
in industry i in terms of value-added and sales.Thus,
/--/,= Xs,, Y
overj = 1 ...n plants in industry i.
A CR-4 ratio higher than 60percent and an HI value far from the
1/N ratio imply that the industry is highly concentrated, which may
or may not indicate oligopolistic power, depending on the perceived
reasons for such indices. HI is preferred over the CR-4 index because
the former takes into account the variations in size structure between
plants and the total number of plants in the industry (Lee 1984).
Concentration ratios are measured for smalland medium plants as
one group, and large plants as another group, since industry sources
explain that both groups cater to different markets. Large shipping
lines and foreign vesselsare serviced by the large shipyards,while small
domestic ships are serviced by the smalland medium repair yards.
Pr_tability
The price-cost margin (PCM) is used here to indicate the relative
profitability of the different plants. PCM is derived by subtractingShipbuilding/Repair and E_atbuilding Industry P, 3 3
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One way of identifying which industry characteristics and
variables are closely related to efficiency indicators is through the use
of discriminant function analysis. The analysis basically tries to
statistically differentiate between two groups, i.e., phnts with positive
DtkC/SER_less than or equal to 1.2, and the rest,with respect to
particular ._riables. The Canonical discriminant function thus
identifies the most important variables which can discriminate
between the efficient and the inefficient plants,is
Among the industry characteristics which might effectively
discriminate between efficient and inefficient plants are the following:
• PartialFactorProductivities.CVA/L and CVA/K are theorized to
have positive imPacts on efficiency, as plants are able to produce
more based on the intensive use of their resource endowments.
• CapitalIntensity. The relationship is hypothesized to be positive
since the use of more capital-intensive techniques will speed up
the production processes aswell asprovide quality results.
• Plant Size. The link is not clear since small and large SB/SR.
plants cater to different customers (i.e., in terms of ship size).
However, the nature of competition facedby smalland large plants
differ for the SB/StL sector so that smallplants are expected to be
more efficient.
15. See Hill and Kalirajan (1991) for a clear exphnation and example of an
application of this technique.34 ,q Edwin GilQ Mendoza
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• I_'ice-CostMargin. The relation ispresumed negative since plants
with high PCMs tend to have oligopolistic powers and have no
incentive to perform efficiently.
• Dummy Variables.
a) Legalorganization
"1" means plant is a single proprietorship; "0" means otherwise.
A firm or plant which is managed by yard owners tends to
perform inefficiently asno room for advancement exists for other
personnel.
b) Periodof Operation
"1" means plant has been operating since 1983; "0" means
otherwise.
This durruny variable serves to ascertain whether entrants after
the trade reform program are more efficient or not.
Discriminant analysis therefore aims to weigh and linearly
combine these discriminating factors in such a way that the two
groups are forced to become as distinct as possible. The analysis
theretbre comes up with one or more linear combinations of these
variables of the form
D, = dt,Z 1 + d,.,Zs +... p
where
D_ = score on discri_rfinant function I;
d = weighing coefficients; and
Z = standardized values of the p discriminating variables used in
the analysis.
For this study, the statistical gauges, which are used to determine
whether the discriminant function can distinguish the two subgroups,Shipbuilding/Repairand BoatbuildingIndustry I_ 3 5
are: low Wilk's lambda and the canonical correlation coefficient
(CCC). The CCC is interpreted in a similar manner as the K2 in
standard ordilaaryleast squares (OLS) regression analysis,while a low
Wilk's lambda indicates that the functions are reliable for
discriminating between the two subgroups.
To determine the relationship between the variables and the two
subgroups, efficient and inefficient, the mean of the two subgroups is
compared to the values of the coefficients of the variables.The closer
the value of the variable is to the value of the subgroup mean, the
more related that particular variable is to the subgroup. This implies
that variables with values closer to the mean of the efficient subgroup
is directly related to efficiency and vice-versa.
The discriminant function wasapplied to asingle set of plant-level
observations for both SB/SR. and boatbuilding sectors. Since CVA/K
and CVA/L are correlated, two equations are made, one for each of
these variables.5
.. Industry Background
AN overview of the prevailing economic situation of the shipbuilding
and ship repair sector is presented first, followed by that of the
boatbuilding sector. The final part describes the industrial and wade
policy environment encompassing the two sectors.
A. SHIPBUILDING AND SHIP REPAIR INDUSTKY
The shipbuilding industry refers to the sector involved in the
construction, launching, and outfitting of watercrafts, while the ship
repair industry deals with the overhaul, improvement, alteration, and
reconditioning of water vessels(PDCP 1972).
Structure
Table 1 summarizes the composition of the Philippine SB/SR
industry which was comprised of152 firms in 1992 (Marina Annual
Report 1992). A significant component of the subsector is the Ship
Repair Afloat (SR.A), composed of 57 small enterprises, which
provides mainly manpower services to shipping lines and to
shipbuilders and repairers. During the 1985 to 1992 period, there was
a general increase in the number of Marina-licensed firms involved in
ship repair, combined shipbuilding and ship repair and shipbuilding
operations. Tables 1 and 2 show markedly different figures because
Table 1 (from Marina) includes small and large firms while Table 2




Ue_tsedShipbuilding andShipRepair Companies: 1985-1992
Type ofOperation orLicense Number ofCompanies
1985 1989 1992
Ship repair 22 84 92*
Shipl_ilding 1 3 3
Ship repair andshtp_Jikling 18 38 57
Total 41 125 182
*APl_mately 57firms are classified asShip Repair Moat.
Source: MARINA Annua/Repode, 19,8S, IggO, 1992
Table 2
Indusl_/Composition: 1972.1988
Typeof OperaUons Number ofPlants
1972 1978 1978 1983 1988
Shipbuilding 9 59 14 15
Boatlouilding 9 10 10 4 6
Shipl_Jilding andrepair 23 38 6 18 31
Total 32 57 75 36 52
$ouroe; Census of Estab//shments, Censal Years 1972-1988. National Statistics Office,
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in terms of employment size,the number of small and me,dium-
sized plants increased over the 1983 to 1988 period, while the number
ofhrge plants decreased (Table 4).Share of small or medium phnts in
aggregate output increased by 60percent, while that oftbe largeplants
decreased by 14 percent.
Ownership structure
The large shipyards in the country are mainly joint ventures with
foreign nationals.The largestshipyard,Subic Shipyard & Engineering,
Inc., formerly PHILSECO, is owned by a consortium of Philippine
enterprises and some Japanese and Singaporean multinationals, while
three other hrge shipyards are subsidiaries ofa Singaporean company.
Some of the medium- and smaU-sized firms are owned by local
shipping companies which use them to service their own shipping
vessels.
Location
Table 3 shows that most shipyards are concentrated in Metro
Manila and Cebu.Together, these two areas constituted 69 percent of
all plants nationwide in 1988. Other hrge shipyards are located in
Batangas, Zambales and Bataan although their head offices are in
Metro Manila. The geographical compactness of the sectors can be
attributed to the availability of"raw materials and supplies in these
trade centers which can affect significantly the efficient delivery of
services by the yards.
Levelof Competition
As an approximation of the level of intra-industry competition,
concentration indices, in terms of value-added and total revenues,are
measured for 1983 and 1988 (Table 5).The concentration measures
(CR.-4) incrvased during this period reaching 63 percent, which is
slightly greater than what is considered as a high degree of
concentration (60 percent). Moreover, the equivalent numbers4 0 ,i EdwinGilQ.Mendoza
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Table3
Distribution ofPlants byMajor Regions: 1983and1988
1983 1988
Area Ships Boats Ships Boats
(%) (%) (%) (%)
National Capital Region 47 25 40 40
Cagayan Valley 7
Central Luzon 9 50 8 20
Southern Tagalog 7 10
Bicol 9 2
Western Visayas 7 7




Total 100 100 100 100
Source:CensusofEstablishments, 1983and1988,National Statistics Office.
Table 4
Employment SizebySubsector: 1983 and1988
Subsector
Employment Size Boatbuilding Shipbuilding andShipRepair
1983 1988 %Change 1983 1988 %Change
Small (5-99) 4 4 19 35 84.21
Medium (100-199) 1 4 5 25.00
Large (>__ 200) 9 6 -33.33
,Total No.of Plants 4 5 25.00 32 46 43.75
Source: Censusof Establishments, 1983and1988,NationalStatistics Office,Shipbuilding/Repair andBoatbuilding Industry I_ 4 1
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Table S
Concentration Ratios bySubsector. 1983 and1988
Subsector
Concentration Ratios Soatbuilding Shipbuilding andShipRepair
1983 1988 %Change 1983 1988 %Change
a.Conoanbation ratio 4
Total revenues 1.00 0.97 -2.90 059 0.63 6.12
Census value.added 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.56 0.62 12.53
b.Herfindahl Index
Total Revenues 0,90 0.45 .50.49 0.12 0.14 23.16
Census value-added0,85 0.79 -7.01 0.10 0.12 18,26
l/N* 0.25 0.2 0,03 0.02
* TheHIwill equal this value ifallfirms inthesector are approximately ofthesame sizes.
Source: Computed from the Census ofEstablishments, 1983 and 1988, National Statistics Off'me.
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derived from the Herfindahl Indices, i.e., l/H, indicate that in 1983,
the industry was about as concentrated as an industry with only nine
equal-sized firms, although there were really 32 firms. 16This could
mean that few large shipyards have control over the market but as
pointed out by Porter (1990), the reason for the concentration is a
more important factor in explaining the degree of intra-industry
competition.As will be pointed out later, the industry is characterized
by market segmentation. Large shipyards cater to large ships, while
medium and small yards service the smaller vessels. Thus, it is not
certain whether the large firms exercise oligopolistic powers based on
the measures used here.
Production Activities
Current shipyard activities are focused on repairing and
drydocking _ratercrafts with the existing supply less than the demand
16. The author wishes to acknowledge Dr. E. Patalinghug for his commen_s
regardingtiffsmatter.4 2 _1 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
for yard work. A 1990 BOI study ascertains that there is an average
waiting period of 2 1/2 months for drydocking. Small- and medium-
sized firms concentrate on domestic ships,which are generally small,
while large firms cater to both foreign and domestic vessels.
Construction of small vesselsis done by very few shipyards and only
occasionally. Ship construction and repair activities use the same
equipment and supplies so that most shipbuilders also engage in repair
operations.
There is clearly economies of scale in ship production since the
surface area of a ship does not increase in direct proportion to its
volume.That is,a200,000 deadweight tons (dwt) can carry ten times
the cargo of a 20,000 dwt ship although the former is only about
twice as long as the latter (Patahnghug 1994). Because construction
costs are tied to surface area and not to volume, such costsare reduced
for large vessels.Moreover, engine size and complexity of machinery
do not increase dramatically in proportion to the size of the ship
leading to power efficiency for large vessels.
Technology
Present technological capabilities are limited to constructing
vesselsbelow the 5,000 dwt range while repair capacities reach up to
the 10,000 dwt to 300,000 dwt range. Seven shipyards account for
approximately 82 percent of the overall capacity Of 570, 153 dwt
(Appendix 1) while only 32 firms (or 21 percent of all firms) have
drydocking facilities. The other firms are small repair firms which
service the sman inter-island vessels using manpower and small
machine shops.Although ship repair is relatively more labor-intensive
than shipbuilding, current techniques used by local shipbuilders are
labor-intensive, which has prolonged the construction time of these
small vessels. Foreign tie-ups have been important channels for
infusing new technology into the industry by way of capital
investments and foreign technical personnel. Leverage International
(Consultants) Inc. (1990) assessed that the large shipyards lead the
industry in terms of technology but, in general, local technology still
lags behind that of other countries.Shipbuilding/Repair and Boatbuilding Industry Ii, 43
Market Orientation
Demand for vessels depends on the growth of the country's
merchant fleet (Marina Development Plan for Maritime Industry
1988).Thus, domestic shipbuilding and ship repair activities are closely
intertwined with the sectoral requirements of the shipping industry.
The major market of the SB/SR firms is the different shipping
companies. Local shipbuilders must necessarily compete with foreign
shipyards in getting the orders of the shipping companies.
Local shipping companies continue to source their bottoms from
the foreign market of used vessels,mostly from Japan, resulting in the
concentration of shipyard operations on ship repair, as in previous
years (FookienTimes PhilippinesYearbook1991).
B. BOATBUILDING INDUSTRY
The boatbuilding subsector deals with the manufacture of
watercrafts having gross tonnages of less than 3 gross registered tons
(grt). Most of the boat manufacturers' products are fiberglass-
reinforced plastic (FRP) boats, yachts, and other vessels for both
domestic and export markets. Some of them also import outboard
engines and engage in boat repairs.
Structure
The actual number of boatbuilders, most of which are single
proprietorships, is not known since they are not required to register
with Marina or any government agency.In 1992, there were at least
six boatbuilders belonging to the Boating Industries Association of
the Philippines (BIAP) located in Metro Manila and Cavite, although
around three foreign-owned companies were also in Cebu and
Bataan. The boatbuilders in Bataan are located in the export-
processing zone, giving them access to duty-free raw materials and
equipment. Over the 1983 to 1988 period, new hoatbuilders entered
the sector, signifying an expansion of activities (Table 2).4 4 4 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
Level_ Competition
The sector is highly concentrated asshown by the large difference
between the HI measures of.45 and .79 and the ratio 1/N or .16.17
The computed 1/H for this sector shows that although there were
four boat manufacturing firms in 1988, the equivalent numbers reveal
that the industry is as concentrated asif only one firm existed then.
There was, however, a substantial decline in the concentration index
during the 1983 to 1988 period, indicating an improvement in the
level of competition faced by the incumbent firms.
Production Activities
Local boatbuilders produce boats with sizes ranging from 8 to 100
feet although the bulk of commercial production is on the 8- to 30-
footer pleasure crafts. Much of the production activities revolve
around motorboats and sailboats,with the latter comprising the major
volume of production. Current manufacturing activities include FR.P
boats or speedboats, and wood power boats.
Technology
The construction of boats in the local industry is generally a labor-
intensive activity with skills in sculpture and carpentry as important
requirements.The production of boats does not require graving docks
or building berths. It does not require immediate access to rivers or
seas although it would be an added advantage to the manufacturer to
be located near bodies of water. There are virtually no significant
structural barriers existing within the industry.
Market Orientation
Since pleasure boats are generally considered luxury items, foreign
visitors or residents and the local elite are the primary customers.
17. An explanation for the 1/n rule of thumb is that, if the firms are of equal sizes,
then the HI is closer to the 1/n value.Shipbuilding/Repair and Boatbuilding Industry I_ 4 5
Other buyers include resort owners and boat racers. Income and price
elasticities of luxury items such as these products are high, making
their demand susceptible to changes in the overall economic and
political climate. Thus, the 1989 political problem of _thecountry
adversely affected_the salesof the local manufacturers.
The high demand for quality sea transport in the archipelago has
led some boatbuilders to diversifyinto seacraftswhich are for ferrying
passengers between islands.The latest of these is the Supercats, a 280-
seater catamaran targeted for plying the Bacolod-Iloilo route (Business
Day, February 3, 1993).
A major reason for the preference ofsome local builders for FR.P
boat production isits great demand in the international market. Since
the early 1980s, domestic boatbuilders have been exportingto
countries like the United States,Japan, and Guam.
GOVE_q_mNT POLICIES AND PROTECTION INDICATORS
Government assistance and regulation of the sector became
intensive in the early 1970s as the government realized the need to
modernize the domestic maritime fleet.
SectoralPolicies
The 1968 Investments Priorities Plan of the Board of Investments
03OI) proffered numerous incentives such asaccelerated depreciation,
tax credit on domestic capital equipment, and pre-operating tax
exemptions t3 the sector (Appendix 2). Capacities of local shipyards
were increased to accommodate the growing domestic fleet. The
Maritime Industry Authority (Marina) was established in 1974 to
regulate and monitor the sector aswell asadminister the tax incentives
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 666. All domestic shipyards were
required to acquire licenses from Marina before they could operate.
Financial assi.,,tancewas made-availablemainly through loans from the
World Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
However, incentives were not only granted to local shipyards but also46 ,q Edwin GilQ.Mendoza
to the shipping sector. Such laws allowed local shipping lines accessto
low cost imported used vessels to the detriment of local ship
manufacturers. As a result, local shipyards concentrated on ship repair
activities. Being a subsector of the SB/SR industry, the boatbuilding
sector was also entitled to these benefits, but only a few boatbuilders
availed of these incentives.
The worldwide econotnic recession of the early 1980s and the
capital flight experienced by the country in 1983 led to the adoption
of stabilization policies which included measures aimed at reducing
the balance of payments and government budget deficits. Thus, the
incentives under PD. 666 were removed in 1984, which adversely
affected the costsof shipyard operations, especiallysince 70 percent of
raw material requirements are imported.Although MARINA revived
these incentives in 1986, they were rescinded again after afew months
by a ruling of the Department of Finance pertaining to foreign
exchange problems.
At present, shipyards having capacities of 10,000 dwt and above
are granted "pioneer" status, and those which locate outside Metro
Manila are entitled to several incentives under the 1987 Onmibus
Investments Code of the BOI. As of this writing, there is also a bill
pending in the Senate which seeks to restore the duty and tax-free
incentives formerly granted under P.D. 666. Again, the boatbuilding
industry can also avail of these incentives provided they meet the
criteria set by the BOI. One common incentive for both sectors isthe
duty drawback system, which entitles exporters reimbursement of
their import duties.
Recent policy changes in the shipping sector which might affect
the SB/SP,. sector include the deregulation of shipping routes and the
requirement that allvesselsbe classedby an internationally recognized
classification society. Many studies have made the observation that
one of the root causes of the inefficiencies in the shipping sector has
been the regulated shipping rates and routes which have rendered the
activity uneconomical.The artificially-low freight rates have made the
business unprofitable so that only the ineumbent firms, which control
various routes, could operate with profits (Nathan &Associates 1991).
The recent deregulation policies implemented by the government/
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may help increase the efficiency of the shipping sector, which may
indirectly prove helpful to the SB/SR sector as well.
TariffR_orm Program
In 1978, tariff rates for ships and boats ranged from 10 to 30
percent with an unweighted mean of 21 percent. The 1981 Tariff
Reform Program (TRP), which aimed at an equal tariff protection
system for allproducts, resulted in a 30 percent tariff rate increase for
ships and 37 for pleasure boats (Appendices 5 and 6). Pleasure crafts
are levied higher tariff rates than ships because they are considered as
luxury items. Over the 1983 to 1988 period, tariff rates for ships and
boats did nm change. For reasons of quality and safety,used vessels
were charged higher tarif_ than new vessels.
A slightly different situation occurred for the tariff rates of their
material inputs. Table 6 indicates a notable decline in nominal
protection for the material inputs ofboatbuiiders from 27.88 percent
in 1983 to only 22.87 percent in 1988.That of ship manufacturers
and repairers, however, decreased slightly to 15.6 percent in 1988
from 15.7 percent in 1983.The sharp reduction in the tariff rates of
fiberglass,resin products, and building boards of wood were the major
reasons for the decline in nominal tariff rates for boatbuilders. On the
other hand, the small reductions in the tariff rates of sheet pilings of
iron or steel and transmission apparatus for navigational use led to the
lowering of protection for the material inputs of the SB/SR sector. In
the 1983 to 1988 interval then, there was no change in the level of
tariff protection for the outputs of the two sectors, although
protection of their inputs declined.
In July 1991, another major tariff rationalization scheme was
effected which further reduced the tariff rates for water vesselsto the
3 to 10 percent range.Tariff rates for pleasure boats, however, were
initially increased to the 50 percent level in 1991, but decreased
gradually to 30 percent in 1995. While the tariff structure for
boatbuilders remained basicallythe same,i.e., higher rates for outputs
than for inputs, nominal protection for the SB/SIL sector underwent





1983 1986 1988 1991 1983 1986 1988 1981
Outputs
Nominal tariffs (Average) 37 37 37 50 30 30 30 6.5
Implicit tariffs for
import substitutes (Nj) 54.12 64.4 50.7 65 46.25 56 43 15,78
Implidt Tariffs forF_xportables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inputs
Nominal tanffs (weighted by
production coeffidents) 27.88 22.87 22.87 16.26 15,7 15.6 15.6 15.14
Implicit tariffs (Ti) 43.87 47.45 35.16 27.89 30 38.69 27 26.65
Average implicit tariff rates
onoutputs* 44.6 33.04 21.65 28.15 41.54 29.66 29.66 5.21
Average implicit tariff rates
I-I1
oninputs* 27.88 22.87 22.87 16.26 15.56 15.58 15.45 15.14 o_
Effective protection rate (EPR) 59.48 43.05 20.23 42.86 50.47 36,92 34.75 1.74 -_-_
Neteffective protection rate
(NEPR) 27.58 14.44 -4.58 1429 20.37 9.54 6.94 -18.61 o
* These tariff rates areaverages oftheimplicit tariff rates onimport substitutes and theimplicit tariff rates onexportable goods.
"-z
CL
Source:. Tariffs andCusforns Code of_he.Ph_Tipl_nes, 1982-1991.Tap;ff Com_ssion. N °Shipbuilding/R6pair and Boatbuilding industry I_ 49
only 6.5 percent for outputs. These changes meant an increment in
protection for boatbuilders but a drastic decrease for the SB/SR
sector.
ImportLiberalizationProgram
A complementary policy of the TRP is the Import Liberalization
Program (II,P) which worked for the removal of quantitative
restrictions on imported items.While pleasure crafts were liberalized
in 1986, new ships and other vessels subjected to quantitative
restrictions since 1977 were only liberalized in 1989. In consonance
with the TRP, used vesselsare still included in the ListC ofRestricted
Items (i.e., items for continued regulation) for reasons of quality and
safety (Appendix 7). MARINA officials assert that importation of
used vessels have to meet particular age and size requirements to
ensure their seaworthiness (MARINA Memo Circular 25-D).
The observed rise in nominal protection for the boatbuilding
sector described in the preceding section can be interpreted as the
"tariffication" of the quantitative restrictions for pleasure craftswhich
were removed in 1986.
As for the material inputs, the steel requirements of the SB/SR
sector were gradually liberalized from 1986 to 1988 while radio
navigational instruments were only liberalized in the latter part of
1988. Outboard engines used by boatbuilders were liberalized in
1989. Most of the major inputs ofboth sectors were liberalized during
the ILP,which may prove helpful,especially since local manufacturers
still do not have the technology to manufacture these materials.
ProtectionIndicators
A more rele_iantindicator of the protection given to the domestic
sectors is the EPR, which considers protection for both inputs and
outputs.
In 1974, the EPR of both sectors averaged 26 percent which is
significantly lower than the manufacturing average of 44 percent
(IPPP 1979). Although the EPRs for ships and boats increased to5 0 i EdwinGil Q, Mendoza
50.47 percent and 59.48 percent, respectively_these declined during
the period 1983 to 1988 asshown in Table 6. From an EPR of 59.48
percent in 1983, the boatbuilding sector's EPR went down to 20.23
percent in 1988, even lower than that of the SB/SR sector's figure of
34.75 percent. These results may prove puzzling, considering that no
changes in nominal tarif_ occurred during the period 1983 to 1988.
Moreover, implicit tariff rates (and hence, EPRs) changed because of
the removal of the 25 percent markups over cost, insurance, freight
(CIF) import prices which prevailed in 1983.A reason for these results
could be the fact that both sectors were exporting their products so
that the "actual" tariff rates which these sectors faced were an average
of their products' implicit tariff rates and that for exports, which is
equal to zero. Table 6 shows these averageimplicittariffratesfor both
outputs and inputs using census data. Although the average implicit
tariff rates for the inputs of the boatbuilders decreased to 22.87
percent in 1988 from 27.88 percent in 1983 (which meant higher
protection), its outputs' average implicit tariffrates declined sharply to
21.65 percent resulting in the low EPR. In the case of the SB/SR
sector, its outputs' average tariff rates also declined drastically from
41.54 percent in 1983 to only 29.66 percent in 1988. But its inputs'
average implicit tariff rates hardly changed, resulting in a smaUdecline
in EPR from 55.10 percent to 36.28 during the 1983 to 1988 period.
Table 6 also gives the sectoral net EPRs (NEPRs) which indicate
protection to domestic plants or sectors afforded by the tariff or tax
system without the disincentive effects of the overvalued currency
(IPPF 1979).Adjusting the EPR valuesfor the currency overvaluation
signifies that the protection levels actually enjoyed by the two sectors
were really low. From 1983 to 1988, NEPR for the boatbuilding
sector was reduced from 27.58 percent to only -4.58 percent, while
that cf the SB/SR sector became 6.94 percent from 20.37 percent.
These results imply that the boatbuilding sector was actually being
penalized by the tariff system asshown by its negative NEPR.
EPR estimates for 1986 and 1991 were made using the industry
structures of 1983 and 1988 respectively.The implicit assumption here
is that the industrial structure was not altered during these years.Table
6 rew._alsan increase in protection for the boatbuilding sector fromShipbuilding/Repair andBoatbuilding industry I_ 51
20.23 percent in 1988 to 42.86 percent in 1991. The 1991 figure,
however, is slightly lower than the 1986 figure of 43.05 percent. On
the other hand, the SB/SR sector experienced a tremendous
reduction in tariffprotection from 36.92 percent in 1986 to only 1.74
percent in 1991.The main reason for these changes isthat there was a
reduction in output tariff rates from an average of 30 percent in 1986
to 6.5 percent in 1991 for the SB/SR sector, and an increase from 37
to 50 percent for the boatbuilding sector.Tariff rates on the inputs of
the SB/SR sector hardly changed, although that of the boatbuilding
sector declined from 22.87 to 16.26 percent.
Looking at the NEPRs, one finds that the SB/SR sector is
receiving negative protection while the boatbuilding sector is still
receiving protection. The 1991 TRP therefore increased the tariff
protection received by the boatbuilding sector, while it reduced that
of the SB/SR sector. How these trade policy developments will affect
the performance of the firms will be discussed in the next chapter.6
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Industrial Performance.
D_.V_LOPM_N'rS in the industry from 1972 until 1991 are examined in




Imported vessels,especially second-hand vessels, have been the
main bulk of the Philippine Maritime fleet. In the 1970s, importation
of second-hand vesselswas given added impetus through government
incentives in order to replace the old domestic fleet. Despite import
restrictions in 1977, the share of used vessels in the total value of
sectoral imports even increased from 15 to 90 percent in 1978 (Table
7 and Figure 1).
In 1984, the government instituted the policy of bareboat
chartering as an alternative to the purchase of the ship users' vessel
requirements. This further biased the shipping lines from procuring
new ships locally, and instead, they opted for the less expensive
second-hand vessels. For the succeeding years, importation of new
ships declined. Even with the implementation of Executive Order
226 in 1987 providing incentives to individuals who procured vessels
abroad, and even with the lifting of quantitative restrictions on
imported new vesselsin 1989, used vesselscontinued to dominate the
country's ship imports. Asshown in Table 7, the country's importation
of vesselsin 1990 in terms of quantity were accounted for by usedTalde7
importsofShipsand PleasureCrafts: 1977-1991 ,L
(In percent)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Commodity Oty. CIF Qty ClF Oty CIF Oty CIF Oty CIF
Value Value Value Value Value
A. Usedships 69.2 15.2 76.8 89.6 56.9 90.8 70.9 79.0 82.8 57.9
B.Newships 3.8 67.5 4.9 9.5 1.6 0.4 5.5 20.7 5.1 38.1
C.Shipsn.e.c. 7.7 17.0 3.7 0.9 17.1 7.9 4.7 0.3 6.1 3.8
D. Pleasure crafts 19.2 0.3 14.6 0.1 24.4 0.9 18.9 0.0 6.1 0.2
Total 100 100 100 100. 100 100 100 100 100 100
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Commodity Qty CIF Qty CIF Qty CIF Oty ClF Oty CIF
Value Value Value Value Value
A. Usedships 66.0 81.9 79.6 99.0 74.4 14.3 96.4 99.3 80.0 37.9
B. Newships 2.0 17.7 0.0 0.0 2.6 4.9 0.0 0.0 14.5 61,5 m
C. Shipsn.e.c. 12.0 0.4 2.0 0.6 10.3 80.5 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.5
D.Pleasure crafts 20.0 0.1 18.4 0.3 12.8 0.2 3.6 0.7 3.6 0.1 =








1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Commodity Qty CIF Qty CIF Qty CIF Qty CIF Qty CIF _'_
Value Value Value Value Value
"0
A.Used ships 77.6 92.1 46.4 95.3 15.7 96.2 48.0 97.2 12.1 92.0 _
B.Newships 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 5.7 -_
EL
C.Ships n.e.c. 3.4 2.1 10.1 1.7 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.1 m
D.Pleasurecrafts 19.0 5.8 42.0 3.0 80.9 3.8 52.0 2.8 82.9 2.3 o
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 5_
CIF • Cost,insurance, Imighl




Source: Foreign Trade Sta_f/c,s, '1977-1992. National StalLstical Coor_nation Board,
V
O1







100 - '............. -.....
._".
"_ 80- ...........
o _I Pleasure boats 60
40
_o - Ships
0 i i . i i r , ! r i
-- "1'7'78 '79'80 '81 '8,,3 '83 '84 '8_'86 '87 '88 '89 '90'91
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, 1977-1991. National Statistical CoordinationBoard.
Figure 2
Exports of Shipsand Boats
.tOO -
80-
Source: Foreign Trade Sta_etics, 1977.1992. National StatisticalCoordlnalion Board,,
II Ill[lShipbuilding/Repairand Boatbuilding Industry It, 5 7
vessels (97 percen0 and pleasure boats (3 percen0, is In contrast, the
share of new vesselsin the total volume of vesselimports rose only by
6 percent from zero in 1989.
Pleasure craft importations comprised a minor role in the
country's volume of water vessel imports in the 1970s. But this
decreased further with the 1981 TILP as tariff rates on these items
were raised by an average of 42 percent.The economic crisis in 1983
further decreased demand for these luxury goods and only with the
economic recovery in 1'986 did imports begin to rise anew.Another
reason for the increase could have been the removal of quantitative
restrictions (QP,s) in the same year.
The protection structure seemed to have a minimal effecton the
importation of ships, although it contributed effectively in curtailing
pleasure boats importation.
The reduction in tariffrates for some items, considered asmaterial
inputs, seemed to have increased their importation. Importation of
some steel materials, such as hot-rolled metal plates and steel bars
(majority of which are used mainly by the SB/StL industry) showed
increments afi:erthese were liberalized in 1988. But in 1990, imports
of these items declined by 37 percent which can be ascribed to the
political and natural calamities experienced by the nation during the
period and the ensuing Gulf Crisis.
Despite the removal of QRs for other material inputs, there were
no remarkable increases in their importations except for watercraft
engines (used by both boatbuilders and SB/SR firms) which were
liberalized only in 1989.
Output
Value of output at constant prices for the entire shipbuilding, ship
repair, and boatbuilding industry grew at different rates over the 1972
to 1988 period (Table 8).The oil price shocks in 1973 to 1974 caused
output to fluctuate during the period. With the granting of several
incentives and government assistance to the sector starting 1975,
18. Figures refer to the share of these vessels to the total value of imported vessels.58 4 EdwinGilQ. Mendoza
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Table 8
Subsector Shams inTotalOutput, Census Value-added
andEmployment: 1972-1988
Subsectors Industry




1972 99,589,000 94.65 5,634,000 5.35 105,223,000
1975 14,368,138 86.46 2,250,000 13.54 16,618,138
1978 44,157,968 98.44 701,771 1.56 44,859,739
1983 114,127,014 99.63 423,622 0.37 114,550,637
1988 96,871,047 96.75 3,253,810 3.25 100,124,857
Census Value-added*
1972 81,270,000 96.63 2,835,000 3.37 84,105,000
1975 32,705,251 77.16 9,679,594 22.84 42,384,845
1978 181,143,523 99.35 1,182,199 0.65 182,325,722
1983 54,701,118 99.79 112,441 0.21 54,813,559
1988 42,063,051 98.40 681,904 1.60 42,744,955
Total Employment
1972 4,769 88.84 599 11.16 5,368
1975 4,102 83.68 800 16.32 4,902
1978 12,017 98.17 224 1.83 12,241
1983 5,432 99.32 37 0.68 5,469
1988 4,82493.15 355 6.85 5,179
*Base year = 1972
Source: Census ofLarge Establishments, Censal Years 1972-1988, National Statistics Office.Shipbuilding/Re'pair andBoatbuilding Industry i_ 59
output composition changed. From nine shipbuilders in 1975, the
number jumped to 31 in 1978, contributing 43 percent of total
output. Despite these incentives, there was no change in the number
ofboatbuilders, and their output even decreased by49 percent during
the period 1975 to 1978.
With the foreign exchange controls in 1983 and the lifting of
incentives in 1984, declines in shipbuilding projects occurred (Table
9).The worldwide recession and the stiff competition offered by the
second-hand market for ships also contributed to the decline. Faced
with the foreign exchange controls and slowdown in production
activities resulting from the depressed demand for new ships, several
shipyards shifted to ship repair activities. Despite the economic
recovery in 1986, no resurgence in building activities surfaced since
demand for ships was adequately met by used vessels from Japan.
Growth in the sector's output was mainly due to repair activities
which, because of the aging domestic fleet, flourished rapidly. In
1988, approximately 97 percent of the sector's output was contributed
by SB/SIL firms.Although the boatbuilders' share in industry output
Wasonly 3 percent in 1988, they experienced a 670 percent increase
during the period 1983 to 1988.
Census Value.AddedandEmployment
Value-added ana employment indicators during the 1972 to 1988
interval reveal varied trends basically analogous to the entire
economy's growth pattern.As the economy picked up in 1988, the
boatbuilding subsector increased its census value-added (CVA) from
Pl12,441 in 1983 to P681,904. However the SB/Stk sector's CVA
decreased from P54,701,118 to only P42,063,051 (Table 8).In spite
of the remarkable increments in the boatbuilding sector's value-added,
its share in aggregate industry CVA remained low (0.37 percent in
1983 and 3.25 in 1988):The employment situation showed a similar
pattern with the boatbuilding sector's share in total industry workforce
increasing from 0.68 to 6.85 percent during the same period.O3
0
Table 9
Marina-registered Shipbuilding Projects: 1980-1991
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Type ofProject No. GRT* No. GilT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT
Barges 42 36 41 25,670 17 6,593 4 1,800 1 450
Tugboats 18 18 21 10,450 7 3,500 1 500
Cargo/pass_ger 8 6 23 22,500 5 3,096 1 5,000
Fishing boat 40 12 15 606 7 436 1 40
Tanker 4 1 3 3,514
Skiff/light boat 4 3 4




Others 32 8 1 1437 o
Total 162 94 132 59,226 131 17,139 22 8,237 9 990 _: ('D.
Q.
0
NTable 9 continued oo
O"
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 _=.
TypeofProject No. GRT* No. GRT No. Gift No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT
Barges ! 625 2 2,500 2 2 3,125 2 1,520 "O
Tugboats 1 311 1 21 1 1 42 _. -.q
Cargo/passenger 3 1,093 2 957 3 809 "
Fishing boat 1 o. oo
Tanker 2 3 1.620 3 1.895 o





Yacht 2 2 169 _-
Others 1 865 ,<:
Total 6 936 S 2,521 11 0 9 6,703 6 2,852 8 2,539
*GRT(gross regislered tons) =_wofh standard measures for measuring theweight ofwater vessels.
S_rce:Msrilime Induslry Au_orily.
V
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Exports
The country's exports of water vessels have been dominated by
pleasure boats and small cargo ships since the 1970s. Other exports
included small-sized fishing vessels. Industry informants, however,
clarify that some of these ships were imported vessels which
underwent conversion prior to export.Table 10 shows a comparison
of the export performance of the SB/SR industry relative to the
boatbuilding sector. Before 198i, ships, including used barges, cargo
vessels,and ships below 3,000 gross tons dominated the total value of
water vessel exports of the country, except in 1979 when exports of
pleasure crafts amounted to $765,109 against $20,629 for ships.
During the 1982 to 1984 period, exports 0fpleasure boats increased
while that of ships declined. In 1983, exports of the sector were
reduced, although pleasure boats still occupied a large part of the
sector's export products. The succeeding years showed changing
patterns, albeit after 1988, exports of ships became minimal. In 1991, j
the country exported pleasure craftsamounting only to $17,895 down
from a peak of $759,737 in 1982.This can partly be explained by the
economic slump which the country experienced in 1991.
INDUSTRY STKUCTURE CHANGES
Table 11 shows that, in terms of employment size, there was a
distinctive increase in the number of smallfirms from 1983 to 1988,
supporting the view that no substantial entry barriers existed for small
repair and building yards. While there was no increment in the
number of medium-sized plants, the large plants decreased from 10 to
only six in 1988. Although these changes indicate an exit of large
plants, another plausible reason is the decline in the number of
employees, as plants moved to more capital-intensive production
techniques.To verify this, the plants were again classified according to
their capital assets.19Table 11 revealsthat with the new classification,
19. Capital assets are measured in terms of the rephcement costs of the firms'
agscts.Shipbuilding/Repair and Boatbuilding Industry I_ 63
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Table 10
Exports ofShips andPleasure Crafts: 1977-1992
(Inpercent)
1977 1978 1979 1980
Commodity Qty CIF Qty CIF " Qty CIF Qty CIF
Value Value Value Value
A.Used ships 6.9 34.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2,3 33.5
B.New ships 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 56.7
C,Ships n.e.c. 10.3 3.1 13,0 80.7 40.2 2.6 40,9 7.7
D.Pleasure crafts 82,8 62.0 87.0 19.3 59.8 97.4 54.5 2.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1981 1982 1983 1984
Commodity Qty CIF Qty CIF Qty CIF Qty CIF
Value Value Value Value
A.Used ships 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0
B.Newships 3.6 58.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C.Ships n.e.c. 27.3 15.4 21.4 35.0 21.2 8.0 5.9 7.7
D.Pleasure crafts 69,1 26.1 78.6 65.0 78.8 92.0 94.1 92.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1985 1986 1987' 1988
Commodity Oty ClF Oty ClF Oty CIF Oty ClF
Value Value Value Value
A.Used ships 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
B.Newships 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C.Ships n.e.c. 15.6 71.3 0.0 0.0 6.3 87.4 12.5 1.9
D.Pleasure crafts 84.4 28.7 100.0 100.0 93.8 12.6 87.5 98.1
Total 100 100 100 100 108 100 100 100
1989 1990 1991 1992
Commodity Oty ClF Oty ClF (]ty ClF Oty CIF
Value Value Value Value
lr
A.Used ships 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
B.Newships 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C.Ships n,e.c. 20.0 10.7 40.7 0.4 0.O 0.0 0.0 0,0
D.Pleasure crafts 80.0 89.3 59.3 99,6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: ForeignTradeSlatisti_, 1977-1992. NationalStatistical Coordination Board,
iiii i ! i i i64 ,9 EdwinGilQ Mendoza





1983 1988 Change (%) 1983 1988 Chang e(%)
Employment size
Small (5.99) 4 4 19 35 84.21
Medium(100-199) 1 4 5 25.00
Large (>_ 200) 9 6 -33.33
Total no.ofplants 4 5 25.00 32 46 43.75
Capital Assets (Pesos)
Small (<5Million) 4 5 25.00 11 31 181.82
Medium(5-20Million) 11 9 -1818
Large (>_ 20Million ) 10 6 -40.00
Total no.ofplants 4 5 25.00 32 46 43.75
Source: Census of Establishments, 1983 and 1988, National Statistics Office,
BI i iu i i I
the number of medium and large plants still declined signifying that
the industry's structurb was rationafized as the large inefficient plants
were eased out.
Even with the absence of high entry barriers, the number of
boatbuilders slightly increased from four in 1983 to only five in 1988.
Majority of the plants in 1988 were all relatively larger than those in
1983.
To examine whether there was an increase in import competition,
IPRs for the boatbuilding sector during 1983 and 1988 were
computed. Note that Phase II of the ILP removed Qlks for pleasure
boats in 1986 while QR.s for new ships remained until 1989. From a
negative index in 1983, the IPRs became significantly high in 1988:
1.284 (Table 12).The negative IPK for 1983 can be explained by the
fact that some imported pleasure boats were re-exported after these
were "modified" by local boatbuilders. Since importation of these:3"
Table 12 _
CT
Indicators ofindustry Structure: 1983 and1988 = O.
"-1
Boatbuilding Shipbuilding andShipRepair -_
Indicators SmallandMedium _ Ladle _ _
1983 1988 Change 1983 1988 Change 1983 1988 Change
(%1 (%) (%1 -' EL
(33
Concentration ratios _ o
Concentration ratio 4 EY E
Totalrevenues 1.00 0.97 -2.90 0.44 0.54 22.73 0.67 0.84 25.37 __.
Census value-added 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 0.54 t0.20 0.59 0.79 33.90
, Hedindahl index _.
Totalrevenues 0.90 0.45 -50.49 0.05 0.11 120.00 0.17 0.28 64.71 ==
Census value-added 0.85 0.79 -7.01 0.06 0.12 100.00 0.17 0.26 52.94 ,2
I/N + 0.25 0.2 0.04 0.0'25 0.11 0.16
Price-cost margin 0.08 -0.05 decreased 0.45 0.2 -55.56 0.32 0.17 -2B.89
Import-penetraUon mUo -0.05 1284 increased * *
• Cannot becomputed due tolack ofdata.
" Size interms ofemployment.
+ Approximate shams ofpiants interms ofcensus va]ue-added ortotal revenues ifair of_ have equal sizes.
Source: Computed Irom Census ofEstabUshments, 1983 and 1988. National S_i_ics Office.
O_
C._66 4 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
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pleasure crafts were not done during the current year, this indicated
that there was some increase in the sector's external competition.
Table 12 shows that during the 1983 to 1988 period, the
concentration indices for the boat manufacturing sector declined,
which may have been caused by increased internal competition. As
noted earlier, the market for the SB/SR sector is segmented so that
separate concentration indices for small or medium plants and hrge
ones need to be calculated. Despite the increase in the number of
small plants, their concentration indices rose, although the CR-4
values are still below the 60 percent benchmark for high
concentration.A reason for this increase could be that highly efficient
new entrants were able to get a large share of the market. For this
segment of the sector then, there was an improvement in competition.
The increased concentration for the large plants can be explained by
the remaining plants' acquisition of the market shares of those which
ceased operations. CR-4 indices for large plants, however, were
greater than 60 percent in 1988. Although this might indicate an
oligopolistic structure, industry sources elucidate that large plants,
which have more advanced technology and bigger facilities, would
have an advantage since they can service larger vesselsmore efficiently
than other large plants with inferior technology and facilities with
lower capacities. ConcentrationindicestheroCore are not su_cient to prove
collusivebehavioramong the plants. Over this adjustment period then,
the expansion and entry ofsmaUplants and the exit of inefficient hrge
and medium ones occurred. Price-cost margins for the two sectors,
however, declined implying a reduction in the profitability of these
manufacturing activities.
Based on these findings, it could be inferred that the ILP
contributed to better competitive conditions for the boatbuilding
sector while changes in the structure for the SB/SR. sector were not
directly influenced by the trade liberalization episode.Shipbullding/R_pairand BoatbuildingIndustry I_ 6 7
EFFICIENCY PF.B.FOI_vIANCE
DomesticResourceCosts
A commonly used measure of efficiency in distorted economies is
the domestic resource costs (DRC) criterion, which indicates the
quantity of domestic resources usedfor everyunit offoreign exchange
earned or saved in the production of an economic good (Bautista et
al. 1979). Comparative advantage of the producing sector is
determined by comparing the DP,.C with the shadow exchange rate
(SER).A positive DlLC lessthan or equal to SElL(DlLC greater than
SELL)implies comparative advantage (disadvantage).
1983-1988 census of establishments data
Table 13 reveals that the DRCs of both sectors improved (i.e.,
decreased), with the boatbuilding industry showing a remarkable
decrease in shadow DlLC from 40.00 in 1983 to 33.11 in 1988.
Compa/ison of the absolute values of the DRCs of the two sectors
show that the boatbuilding sector has relatively lower DlLCs than the
SB/StL sector for both years.This means that the 66 percent reduction
in EPR for the boatbuilding sector helped it in remaining less
inefficient than the SB/SR sector in allocating its resources.
However, both subsectors did not meet the efficiency criterion
defined by a DILC less than or equal to SER.,signifying that.they still
had acomparative disadvantage in their respective activities in rUation
to other manufacturing activities. But the boatbuilding subsector's
DR.C/SEIL waslower than that of the SB/SlL for both yeats implying
that the former was a more efficient saver or earner of foreign
exchange than the latter sector.
Results of the sensitivity analysiswith respect to the interest rate
show that higher interest rates lead to higher DlLCs.
At the plant level, the number of efficient (or low-cost) SB/SlL
plants rose wath 11 plants becoming efficient in 1988 from only nine
in 1983 (Table 14). Moreover, from six small efficient plants in 1983,
this increased to seven in 1988, although it could not be determined68 ,_ Edwin Gil Q, Mendoza




Efficie,¢y Measures 1983 1988 Change 1983 1988 Change
(%) (%)
DomesUcResource Costs
DRCs'(10%interestrate) 121.52 107.25 -11.74 40.00 33.11 4,96
DRCs(s.d,*) 225.34 270.63 20.10 1,064.772,010.93 88.86
DRC/SER 8.75 4.07 -53.51 2.66 1.47 -44.71
DRCrn* 131.23 116.18 -11.47 39.96 42.80 7,10
DRC/OER 11.81 5.51 -53.34 3.60 2.03 -43.55
DRCs*(12%interestrate) 159,45 126.23 -20.83 39.54 41.72 5.51
DRCs(s.d,)* 103.43 278.88 169.63 399.015,292,35 1,226.37
DRC/SER 11.48 4,79 -58.30 2.85 1.58 -44.42
Technicalefficiency
index 0,39 0.29 -26.51 -- --
Protectionmeasure
Effective protection rate 55.10 36.28 -34.15 60.14 20.44 -66,02
EPR(s.d,) 49.39 6.30 -87.24 1.73 0.56 -67.38
DRCs* = DRCatshadow prices
DRCm* = DRCatmarket prices
(s,d.*) = standard deviation
1983 Shadow exchange rate = 13.89
1988 Shadow exchange rate = 26.368
1983Official exchange rate = 11.1147
1988Official exchange rate = 21.0947






DomesticResource Cost(DRC) byPlantSize "_
'u
Number ofPlants
0 <DRC/SF.R< t.2 1.2<DRC/SER< 1.S ORC/SB_> ;.S ORC/SER< 0 Total
Efficient Moderately Inefficient Dissaving Q- w
Want Size Inefficient Foreign Exchange o _0
(Employment) 1983 1988 1983 1988 1983 1988 1983 1988 1983 1988 =
Q,.
Boatbuilding = CQ
5-99 1 3 3 1 4 4 5-
11111-199 1 1 _"
>200 0
Total 0 1 0 0 3 4 4 5
Shlp_ld]ng/ShipRepair
5-99 5 6 1 6 10 18 3 5 19 35
100-199 2 3 2 2 4 5
>200 1 7 5 2 9 6
Total 9 11 I 6 17 25 7 5 32 46
Source: CwtwJe of_w/ng Eafabf/shmente, 1_ and1988.National Sta_llcsOffice,
o_
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whether the same plants in 1983 were efficient in 1988. For medium-
sized plants, the number of efficient firms remained the same during
the period. Although no large plants were efficiently saving foreign
exchange in 1983, one large efficient plant was observed in 1988.
During this period, the share of efficient SB/SR plants in census
value..added increased from 9.75 to 1.9.34percent.
Out of five boatbuilders, only one was efficient in 1988, but this
was an improvement over the year1983 when no boat manufacturer
was efficient. Looking at the standard deviations of SB/SR. sectors'
DRCs, one finds a decrease from 101.79 to 88.34. These results are
still widely disparate, indicating that high-cost firms were allowed to
operate along with the more efficient ones.
1986-1991 Survey of establishments data
The survey data covers the period when the tariffrates for the two
sectors' products were altered and import restrictions on some ships
were removed. This interval also covers the period when the
boatbuilding firms were making adjustments to the removal of QRs,
although they experienced higher protection (i.e., higher tariff rates)
in 1991. Approximately 20 SB/SR firms responded to the survey
with only 10 of them giving fairly complete data.
The calculated DRCs for these firms are presented in Table 15.
From three efficient SB/SP_ firms in 1986, this dropped to only two
in 1991. Of the three efficient ones in 1986, only one remained
efficient in 199.1while the rest became highly inefficient.
Only two boatbuilding firms out of six had sufficient data for
DRC calculations. The results showed that both firms became
inefficient savers or earners of foreign exchange in 1991.This sector
became even more protected in 1991, so that this could be one of the
reasons for the observed inefficiency.
For both sectors then, the improvement in efficiency during the
1983 to 1988 period was not sustained in 1991.A major reason for
this could be the existence of external factors which might have
detrimentally affected the performance of the firms.As most shipyard
managers chim, the general economic climate, which prevails overShipbuilding/Repair and Boa_uildingIndustry I_ 7 1
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Rrms 1986 1991 Change 1986 1991 Change•
F1 54.52 * increased 1.95 • increased
F2 236.03 * increased 8.43 * increased
(inmarket prices )
Firms DRCm DRC/OER*'*
1986 1991 Change 1986 1991 Change
(%) (%)
F1 81.14 * increased 3.62 * increased




Firms 1986 1991 Change 1986 1991 Change
(%) (%)
F1 24.33 310.85 11.78 0.87 9.05 9.41
F2 * * increased * * incn_ased
F3 * * increased * • increased
F4 79,901.21 38.65 decreased 2,854.89 1.13 decreased
F5 58.69 36.89 -0.37 2,10 1.07 -0.49
F6 * 4,581.39 decreased • 133.37 decreased
F7 ° * increased " * incRJased
F8 15.64 * increased 0.56 " * Increased
F9 35.30 * increased 1.26 * increased





Firms 1986 1991 Change 1986 1991 Change
(%) (%)
F1 28,86 349.48 11.11 1.29 12,72 8,87
F2 * * increased * * increased
F3 * * increased * * increased
F4 * 46.55 decreased * 1,69 decreased
F5 138,95 43.61 -0,69 6,21 1.59 -0,74
F6 116.02 5,522.42 increased 5.18 200.96 increased
F7 * * increased " * increased
F8 19.97 * increased 0.89 * increased
F9 38.72 * increased 1.73 * increased
FIO 19.01 39.43 1.07 0,85 1,43 0.69
• Indicates that firmsarenegative savers/earners offoreign exchange
•* 1986 Shadow exchange rate($ER) =27.988
•* 1991 Shadow exchange rate(SER) =34.35
•** 1986Official exchange rate(OER) =22.39
•** 1991Official Exchange Rate(OER) =27.48
Ifa firmhasaDRC/SER _<12,ithascomparative advantage over other firms,
Ifa firmhasa DRC/O'ER .._1.2,ithascompetitive advantage over other firms.
Source: $urveyofManufacturingEstab/ishrnents, 1983and 1988.
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the year, greatly affects their operations. While the economy grew by
1.86 percent in 1986, the country posted only a .32 percent GNP
growth rate for 1991 (NEDA 1992). The low growth rate in 1991,
coupled with natural calamities and political instabilities, might have
induced firms to perform lessproductively. Boatbuilders also explain
that such problems damage their business as less people are likely to
engage in cruising or yachting.
Snlall yards, however, blame too much competition as the reason
for their underutilized facilities. Interviews with industry people
reveal that trade policy changes affected their operations differently.
With the increased imports of vessels, the small firms, whichShipbuilding/Repair andBoatbuilding Industry I_ 73
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constructed small fishing vesselsand tugboats, had to institute certain
cost-cutting measures,while firms engaged primarily in repair services
felt that they benefited from the proliferation of imported vessels.
Most of them claim, however, that it was the institution of the
value-added tax and the removal of incentives similar to P.D. 666
which adversely affected their operating costs. Faced with higher
costs, they simply adjusted their prices upward, which again affected
their ability to compete with other yards, especially foreign ones.
Given that most of them are engaged in fairly the same repair jobs,
this would have minimal repercussions on tl_eircompetitive positions
if not for some yardswhich practiced underpricing.
One firm alsopointed out that it was unable to perform efficiently
because of some government policies, which prohibited its servicing
of foreign ve_els with a crew espousing different ideological beliet_.
In effect, their facilitieswere often underutilized because of this clause
in the firm's Charter.
Most shipyard managers maintain that they have minimal
problems with workers in terms of training and sells. However, there
has been agrowing shortage of qualified technical personnel in recent
years because of the more lucrative opportunities offered by jobs
abroad, especially in the Middle East.
The respondent boatbuilders explained that the recent trade
reforms affected their operations in diverse ways. Although they
,benefitted from the reduction of tariff rates on their inputs, they felt
that these were not enough to make them competitive internationally.
Compared to other Asian boatbuilders who have duty-free privileges
in importing raw materials and access to automated building
equipment, local boatbuilders can not compete effectively.
Technical Efficiency
The Technical Efficiency Index (TEl) depicts how the resources
of the plant were used effectively.A TEl close to one means that the
plant is using its resources efficiently,or it is near the frontier which
indicates the domestic 'best practice' technology. Due to the limited
number of sample plants for the boatbuilding industry, TEl estimates7 4 _1 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
were done for the SB/StL subsector only.Table 13 reveals that the
subsector'sTEI showed a decreasefrom 39.46 percent in 1983 to only
29 in 1988. This means that the sector's efficiency in maximizing its
output, given its resources, declined in spite of the fact that it became
efficient in allocating its resources.The number of plants which had
TEI's of 75 to 100 percent, i.e.,the range of technically efficient phnts
according to Hill and Kalirajan (1991), dwindled from seven efficient
plants (or 25 percent of the total plants) in 1983, to only two plants
(or 4.3 percent of the total plants) in 1988. This decline could be
attributed to the reduction in the number of technical and skilled
personnel such as naval architects or engineers who were lured by
more financially rewarding jobs abroad (Marina-JICA 1991).Another
cause was the aging facilities of the shipyards which could not be
upgraded immediately because of the large sums of money such an
activity entailed.
CompetitiveAdvantage
An industry's private profitability in the marketplace can be
measured by the DR.C, expressed in market prices (DRCm). Firms
or plants with positive DRCm/OER less than or equal to 1.2 are
considered efficient in the marketplace, relative to those having
DRCm/OER greater than 1.2. Computations based on census data
show that the two sectors were not performing profitably asshown by
their high DRCms (Table 13).The decline in DRCm/OER over the
adjustment period was not enough to make the two sectors
competitive.The boatbuilding sector still had a competitive edge over
the SB/SR sector asshown by its DRCm/OER ratio of 1.68, which
is lower than the SB/S/L sector's figure of 4.9 in 1988.
Looking at specific plants in the SB/SR sector, the number of
plants having comparative advantage increased from seven to 10 plants
during the 1983 to 1988 period. Only three plants showed
competitive advantage during the same time interval. This indicates
that socially efficient plants were not necessarily earning private
profits.Shipbuilding/Repair andBoatbuilding Industry i> 75
Albeit no boatbuilder was performing profitably in 1983, one
plant which showed aDR.Cm lessthan or equal to OER. was observed
in 1988.This plant also showed a comparative advantage over other
plants.
Looking at specific factors which raised DRCm above shadow
DR(;, one finds that value of fixed assets and working capital
increased,signifying that the high capital costsincurred by both sectors
affected their competitiveness. Labor costsalso il_creasedby more than
capital costs ¢br the boat uaanuf3_cturers, which may indicate that the
distortive effects on wages of labor laws also had a negative impact on
the efficiency of the sector in the market. For the SB/SIk sector, its
labor costs increased as well, but not as much asits capital costs.
The survey data revealed a similar pattern with the firms which
were socially t,nprofitable, not earning as well in terms of private
profits (/'able 15).
Factorintensityand l#o,tuctivityhzdicators
Both subsectors showed increases in their capital productivities (in
real terms) with that of the boatbuilding sector increasing from .10 in
1983 to .14 in 1988 (Table 16). Capital prodt, ctivity for the SB/SR.
sector rose slightly to .038 in 1988 from .037 in 1983.This could have
resulted.from the greater utilization of excesscapacity which the firms
maintained in 1983. During the same period, labor productivity for
both sectors decreased with that of the boatbuilding sector declining
from P3,038.95 to only P1,920.86 and that of the SB/SR. falling from
P10,070 to P8,719.The SB/SR sector, however, still remained more
labor-intensive than the boatbuilding sector in absolute terms. The
expansion of the boatbt,ilding sector's ot,tput was tht,s accompanied
by an increase in its capital productivity, which could explain the table
with observed i,nprovement in efllciency performance. The rise in
capital productivity for the SB/Stk subsector could also be the cause
of the improvement in the sector's efficiency. C.apital-intensity for
both subsectors declined, which might have caused the decrease in
their labor productivity indices.O'3.
A
Table16
Performance Indicators bySubsectors: 1983 and1988
Shipbuilding/Ship Repair Boatbuild[ng
Performance Indicators 1983 1988 Change (%) 1983 1988 Change (%)
Capital productivity (CVNK) 0.037 0.038 1.83 0.10 0.14 43.09
Labor productivity (CVNL) P10,070.16 P8,719.54 -13.41 P3,038.95 P1,920.86 -36.79
Capitalintensity(WL) 268,903.71 .228,648.41 -14.97 31,394.80 13,867.90 -55.83
Output percapital (VO/K) 0.08 0.09 12.41 0.36 0.66 81.23
Output perlabor (V0/L) 21,010.1 3 20,081.06 -4.42 11,449.25 9,165.66 -19.95 rn
Q_
__
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DISCI:UMINANT ANALYSIS
To provide a quantitative assessment of the relationship between
industrial efficiency and certain plant characteristics, canonical
discriminant analysis was employed. Two equations were specified:
Equation 1 used the "capital productivity index (CVA/K) as the
discriminant variable for measuring factor productivity, while
Equation 2 used the labor productivity index (CVA/L).Whether the
discriminant function can effectively discriminate between the
efficient and inefficient ph..ts, depends on the values of the Wilk's
lambda and the canonical correlation coefficient (CCC). Table 17
shows that Equation 1 had a lower Wilk's lambda and a higher CCC
than Equation 2. This implies that the discriminating variables of
Equation 1 are more reliable than Equation 2. Thus, the CVA/K can
be considered as a more important discriminating variable than
CVA/L. The Wilk's lambda and CCC of Equation 1 equal .4493 and
Table 17
Results ofCanonical Discdminant Analysis
F..q_lJon I Eclualon 2
WilWs lambda 0.4493 0.4756
Cano_a]conelation coefficient 0.7421 0.7246
Qassmeans oncanonical variables
Low costs (efficient) -0.9717 -0.9217
High costs (inefficient) 1.1799 1.1192
Variables Coefficient
Capital intensity (K/L) 0.9667 1,0889
Price-cost margin -0.4911 -0.6012
Pedod ofoperation 0.4194 0.3955
Ageofequipment 0.6733 0.6837
Legal on_mization 0,2473 0.3135
c_l prod_/(CVNK) -0.3568 -
Labor produolJvity (CMNL) -- -0.3449
SOUrCe:Census of Manufacturing Establishments, 1983 and 1988.
i ii78 _ Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
.74, respectively,which means that the discriminating variables can be
relied upon in distinguishing between low cost and high cost plants.
The variable that can discriminate effectivelybetween the efficient
plants and the inefficient ones (i.e.,variables with high coefficients in
absolute terms) is the capital-labor ratio (or capital-intensity) for both
equations. For equation 1, the age of equipment index is the second
most important variable, while in Equation 2, capital-intensity is the
second most critical.These results suggest that capital is avital element
in determining the efficiency of the plants. They also imply that
efficient and inefficient plants vary considerably in the amount of
capitad equipment which they employ. The existence of the PCM as
a significant discriminating variable indicates the importance of the
industrial structure in determining the relativeefficiency of the plants.
The subgroup or class designated as efficient has a mean bearing
the negative sign for both equations. Thus, coefficients of variables
with values close to the value of the subgroup efficient (i.e., negative
value_)are directly correlated with efficiency.The farther the values of
the coefficients are (i.e., the higher positive values of the variables)
from the subgroup efficient, the more correlated they are with the
subgroup inefficient. Two variables show negative signs for both
equations: PCM and the factor productivity indices. This, therefore,
implies that the factor productivity and the profitability measure
(PCM) played an important role in the efficient performance of the
plants.The positive value of the capital-intensity index signifies that
plants,which used more capital-per unit oflabor, were not necessarily
efficient. The positive relationship between the PCM and efficiency
implies that the more efficient plants were also operating profitably.
FACTORS AFFECTING INDUSTRIAL PEKFORMANCE
External factors, such as demand conditions and the production,
environment, can have distinctive influences on the efficiency of the
firms. Not all of these factors, however, can be influenced by policies
so that any trade policy changes may not be adequate to make firms
perform efficiently.Shipbuilding/Repair, andBoalbuilding Industry I_ 79
Demand Conditions
Although there are minimal problems with respect to the demand
for ship repair, demand for new local ships has been low.As stated
earlier,the primary constraints for local domestic construction include
limited financing and the competition proffered by imported used"
vessels.Industry sources explain that domestic construction of a 1,000
dwt tanker in 1992 would reach around P35 to P40 million, while
importation of second-hand 1,000 dwt tankers would cost only
around P20 million. Furthermore, local construction would take
approximately eight to 13 months, while importation ofvesselswould
take only three to five months with lesser capital risks involved, At
present, bareboat chartering provides the cheapest way for importing
vessels,since it entails paying only a 4.5 percent tax as compared to
building new vesselswhich leads to paying 35 percent in import duties
and taxes (Study on Shipbuilding Industry 1989).The 12 percent limit
on the rate of return on shipping investments and the numerous
administrative problems regarding shipping rates and voyage routes
have rendered the construction of new vessels not viable (Leverage
International [Consultants], Inc. 1990).This lack of demand for new
ship construction has not allowed the shipyards to gain the benefits of
economies of scalewhich can lead to more efficiency gains.
Industry sources also claim that the long run costs of importing
second-hand vessels are roughly equivalent to the long run costs of
having ships locallybuilt, because imported vesselshave higher quality
due to the technology applied in their construction:Thus, shipping
lines prefer to buy second-hand vessels which require low initial
cap!tal requirements.
Some shipyard managers believe that growth of the SB/SR
industry depends on developments in the shipping sector, and that the
recent move to deregulate the shipping industry will have a positive
impact on their operations.
As for the boatbuilding subsector, domestic demand has also been
limited because of the higlf costs of these pleasure crafts. But the
export market has been favorable for certain types of boats.80 _ Edwin GilQ.Mendoza
Barriersto Entry/F.xpansion
Entry barriers for the SB/SIL sector include the large capital
requirements for setting upthe drydocking facilities. Based on survey
data, high interest rates prove to be the most significant barrier to
"both entry and expansion,followed by technology acquisition, access
to finance, and excessive competition. The last barrier is more
pronounced in the case of small firms engaged mostly in repairjobs,
where entry does not require much capital. New technology
acquisition has also became an important entry barrier,since demand
for quality repairjobs require the latest technology. One policy-related
entry barrier, which foreigners find restrictive, is the constitutional
prohibition of sole ownership byforeign nationals of firms engaged in
particular production activities,
For the respondent boatbuilding firms, the most important
barriers to entry are the limited domestic demand for their products,
control by existing firms of the distribution channels, and bureaucratic
procedures (for the new entrant). The limited local demand for
pleasure boats arise from its nature as aluxury commodity and hence
its high cost.
Technology-Related Factors
Most of the equipment and facilities found in domestic shipyards
are old and require upgrading.This situation has effectively decreased
the shipyards' ability to compete with other foreign yards.Only firms
with foreign tie-ups enjoy the latest technology in their respective
fields of operations.
Unlike shipbuilding nations such asJapan and South Korea where
shipyards have close links with research institutions, the country has
no research institution which caters to the technology needs of the
industry.
The present technology practiced by boatbuilders may be labor-
intensive but their products are competitive in the world market in
terms of quality. Their main problem is the delivery time of their
products, which is determined by the labor-intensive nature of their
production techniques.Shipbuilding/Repair and Boatbuilding Industry I_ " 8 1
Antillary Industries
Most of the SB/SR.'s raw material requirements are imported
because the local support industries are unable to meet the quality
standards required by the shipyards.The local iron and steel industry m
can only provide steel sheets and structures up to a certain thickness
(Leverage International [Consultants] Inc. 1990). No industrial
machinery industries exist in the country which caters to the specific
needs of the sector so that engines and other equipment have to be
imported. Faced with high tariff rates and numerous bureaucratic
requirements, most firms are unable to meet the delivery schedules set
by the client ships.
All these elements affectingindustrial productivity dearly supports
the idea that the industry facesseveralconstraints in their productivity
growth, .which may not be effectively minimized by trade policy
reforms. Assistance programs aimed at helping the sector should be
geared towards reducing or even eliminating these bottlenecks toward
the sector's productivity growth.
SHIPBUILDING/I_PAIIk POLICIES OF SELECTBD ASIAN COUPES
Among the leading SB/SR. nations in the world, Korea and Japan
have successfully implemented policies geared at improving their SB/
SIk sectors. The current policies of the Korean government revolve
around three aspects:upgrading and maintenance of present facilities,
technology development, and "localization" of equipment and
machineries. Similarly, the Japanese government puts emphasis on
technological development, specifically, manpower development
training, and the development of "ships of the next generation"
Another policy currently pursued by Japan is the provision of
technology-related assistance grants to other countries through
manpower training schemes.This has been amajor source ofassistance
for Philippine shipbuilders and repairers.
The Indonesian andThailand governments are activelypromoting
their SB/SR industries through severalfiscaland marketing assistance82 .i Edwin GilQ.Mendoza
schemes. Both countries offer duty-free importations of equipment,
machineries, and raw materials used by the sector. What is very
important in these laws are that they are effectively followed and
executed by the itnplementing agencies.
Singapore also promotes its SB/SR industry,but the development .
of its maritime industry, however, is due to its location as the
Crossroadsfor major shipping lanes in the AsiaPacific.Industry experts
assessthat Singaporean yardsare able to compete effectively in terms
of price and quality,so that current policies are addressed at optimizing
and enhancing skills training, application of mechanized technology
to shipyard operations, closer cooperation between specialized tertiary
institutions and shipyards,and continued government investment in
research and development (R.&D) infrastructure.
These policies show some similarities with Philippine SB/SR laws
and regulations.What ishcking isstrict enforcement and sustainability
in policy implementation. The Marina is tasked with regulating the
sector, but its limited resources has severely restricted its efficiency. Its
regulatory decisions may alsohave introduced some distortions which
have affected the sector adversely (Balisacan 1990).7
Conclusion, and Recommendations
study reveals that the 1981 trade reforms resulted in lower
protection levels for the SB/SR and boatbuilding sectors during the
1983 to 1988 period, but the changes were minimal because the tariff
rates for the two sectors' outputs were not altered. Quantitative
restrictions were still pervasive in the SB/SR. during thisperiod, while
importation of pleasure boats were liberalized only in 1986. Estimates
of the EPRs, however, reveal that the boatbuilding sector became less
protected than the SB/SR sector in 1988 and the EPRs within the
two sectors were narrowed down. But the 1991 TRP resulted in a
different outcome: very low tariff rates for ships and high tariff rates
for pleasure boats.This implies that the effective protection received
by the SB/SR sector continued to decline while that of the
boatbuilding sector increased.
Trade liberalization benefitted the sectors by lowering high tariff
rates and removing non-tariff barriers on imported raw materials,
making these more accessible to domestic producers.As a result, both
sectors posted gains in their productivity performance between 1983
and 1988 with the boatbuilding subsector performing relatively better.
Capacity utilization and capital productivity were raised. More
competition from foreign pleasure boats also induced domestic
boatbuilders to adopt cost-cutting measures, thereby improving their
efficiency and competitiveness. These results, along with the
normalization of economic and political activities in 1986, led to the
expansion of the outputs of firms in both sectors.
While ship repair operations expanded, shipbuilding activities
further declined because of market conditions and government
policies which discouraged ship manufacturing activities. Unable to8 4 _1 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
compete efficiently with imported used vessels,local ship producers
shifted to repair activities. This flexibility in shipyard operations has
been the main reason why shipyards continue their activities even
with the decline of orders for new ships.
Mixed changes in the structure of the two sectors occurred during
the adjustment period. Concentration in the boatbuilding sector
declined, but that in the SB/SR sector increased despite the rise in
the number of small- and medium-sized SB/SR plants. An
explanation for this could be that some of the new entrants were very
efficient, which allowed them to take a large share of the market,
resulting in the increase in concentration. Profitability for both
subsectors, however, declined.
All these findings can only be partly attributed to the relaxation of
trade policies, since there were other macroeconomic events and non-
price factors which might have influenced the firms' responses.Thus,
despite some favorable developments on the trade policy side, the
industry still did not attain the efficiency level (defined by a positive
DRC/SER lessthan or equal to one which would have allowed it to
gain comparative advantage. One should note, howeveq_ that the
analysis covers the 1983 to 1988 period which is considered onlyas a
transition period, since the TRP is still in progress. Results of the
analysis show that the observed improvement in 1988 were not
sustained in 1991. Structural- and policy-related factors have probably
been responsible for these inefficiencies. On the supply side, outdated
technologies, huge capital requirements for expansion or technology
acquisition, and lack of quality raw materials are among the structural
impediments to the better performance of the sectors. Under strong
demand growth conditions, these impediments would normally be
overcome but obstacles on the demand side, such asscarcity of capital
for ship construction, ship financing, and the oligopolistic nature of
the domestic shipping industry,proved to be problematic aswell. Like
the SB/SR sector, the boatbuilders also faced serious constraints such
as lack of information and scarce domestic marketing channels and
infrastructure problems, specifically,the lack of marinas for launching
their boats. In addition, inconsistent and restrictive government
policies have adversely affected the performance of th_ sectors. One,Shipbuilding/Rspair andBoatbuilding industry I_ 85
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glaring example of this was the implementation and withdrawal of
incentives under P.D.666 over a few months.
These concerns were pointed out in past studies and most of them
concluded that government should actively participate in developing
the industry.The SB/SR sector plays a vital role in the growth of the
entire maritime industry, and the shipping sector cannot perform
e_ciently without its capable support.A review of SB/SR policies of
ourAsian neighbors also revealsactive government involvement with
the sector. Whatever decisions the government make, serious
consideration must first be made as to whether the promoted sector
has a potential dynamic comparative advantage or not.
Results of the study indicate that the boatbuilding sector is a
relatively less inefficient foreign exchange earner or saver than the
SB/SR. sector. This supports the view that manufacturers of water
vesselsin the country have the potential for being competitive in the
construction of small boats. It is recommended then that shipyards tap
their resources in the production of boats.Just recently, some foreign
boatbuilders successfully manufactured yachts to ply the inter-island
routes. This practice can be a starting point before construction of
larger vessels is undertaken. Besides, the favorable export market for
these boats will allow the firms to take advantage of scale economies.
Shipbuilders and repairers should also continue to upgrade their
technology to become competitive. Boatbuilders should also consider
entering into joint ventures with foreign partners for purposes of
technology acquisition and marketing coUaboration.They'should also
continue joining international pleasure boats exhibits to improve their
designs and image.
It is also recommended that further studies be made on the impact
of domestic policies, especially with the 1991 trade policy reforms
which have further decreased trade protection for the SB/SR sector
but increased that for the boatbuilding sector. It is also interesting to
look into how the recent deregulation of the shipping industry affects
the SB/SR sector.
The policy implications of the study include the continued
liberalization of the sectors concerned, especially on the input side, to
improve access to necessary material inputs. Policy reforms should8 6 _1 Edwin Gil Q. Mendoza
also be made to address the high interest rates, foreign exchange
controls, and wage distortions which have prevented the firms from
achieving international competitiveness. Government should also:
1) Improve customs administration;
2) Foster and strengthen the accessof local firms to more advanced
technologies bycontinuing itsprograms on developing appropriate
technologies through the Marina and the large shipyards;
3) Develop the sectors' access to financial resources, especially for
acquiring new technologies;
4) Help in the dissemination of information regarding government
policies affecting the industry (e.g., duty drawbacks);
5) hnplement efficiently the duty drawback system and other
incentive policies so as to encourage domestic firms to export
their products, and to remove the bias against small firms; and
6) Assistin the dissemination of market information.
More significantly, the government should continue to develop the
country's infrastructure services (telecommunications, power supply,
marinas for boats, ports and wharves) which are dismally inadequate.
Recent developments_in the SB/SK sector reveal that foreign
shipyards are interested in investing in the country due to its abundant
labor force. From a policy viewpoint, it is beneficial then if the
government continue to simplify itsinvestment procedures. Owing to
the large capital outlays needed by the SB/SR sector,foreign capital is
of great help in alleviating the sector's plight.
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Company Name Capacity Percentage
(DWT)
" 1. Subic Shipyard andEngineering, Inc.
(formerly PHILSECO) 300,000 52.62
'* 2. Keppet {Philippines) Shipyard, Inc. 43,550 7.64
subsidiary: Cebu Shipyard
&Engineering Works, Inc.
3. AG&PBatangas Marine andFabdcation Yard 39,900 7.00
4. 7-RPort Services 24,000 4.21
5. Sandoval Shipyard, Inc. 19,000 3.33
6. Philippine Tdgon Shipyard 9,750 1.71
7. F.F. Cruz &Co.,Inc. 7,500 1.32
8. Others 126,453 22.18
Totalcapacity 570,153 100
* Acquired by Philyard HoldingsInc.in December1993.
** Acquiredthe PhilippineNationalOil Corporation(PNOC) Dockyardin 1992 butstarted
operationsonly in mid-1993.
Source:Ma/ayaShipping SpeclaJ Feature,June28,199_(based onMARINAReports).C.D
Appendix 2 "_
Government Policies Affecting theShipbuitding/Repair andBoatbuilding Industry A
A. Pre-TRP Policies/Programs
Laws/Programs Description Remarks
Executive Order No. 356 Esta_ished theNational Shipyards and Lack ofcapital hampered NASSCO from
(1950) SteelCorp.(NASSCO) toembark upon a operating efficiently. Itsfacilities, e.g.,
Ship_ildingProgram andtodevelop Bataan National Shipyards, weretoo
ironandsteel mills/foundries, largefortheinterisland ships, yettoo
small for_ean-going vessels.
Republic ActNo.1407 Allocated funds from theNational Treasury Discouraged local construction asshipping
Philippine Shipping Act oft955 nototherwise usedfortheprocurement lines opted forthepurchase ofimported
(August 1955) ofvessel from domestic orforeign sources vessels which werereadily available.
through theNational Development Corporation
(NDC) andReparations Commission.
Repui:lic ActNo. 1909 Appropriated funds forfinancing thelocal Thelaw wasnever implemented since
Philippine Coastwise Shipping construction ofvessels. Congress didnot indicate thesource ofthe o_rn
Actof1956(22June 1957) funds. _-
G;
Republic ActNo. 5186 Theindustry was included inthefirst Theindustry was finally afforded incenfives
investment Incentives Act Investments Priorities Plan asapreferred which included, among others, accelerated
Omnibus Investments Code of1967 area ofinveslment, depreciation, taxcredit ondomestic =_
£)..
Board ofInvestments (BOt) capital equipment, andpre-operating o N
expenses taxexemptions. =Appendix 2 continued __.
'10
Republic Act No.6135 Provides incentives toexport.odented Theboatbuilding sector wasabeneficiary _c.°-
Export Incentives Actof1970 industries, ofsuch incentives. _:
Board ofInvestments (8OI) -_
tb
"O
4thInvestments Priorities Plan Theindustry wasstill classified asapioneer Several shipyards availed oftheincentives =
(02May1970) non-pioneer industry depending onthesize andtow approved capacities asof1972 were:
ofvessels constructed orplant facilities, a)Barges andtugboats- 65,600 dwt o. m
b)Fishing vessets - 12,565 gt o
c)Inter-island ships -21,400 gt _-
0..
Republic ActNo.37Revised Tariff Levied parts andraw materials ofthe Theindustry claimed that thistawpenalized _ 5
Customs Code ofthePhilippines SB/SR industry aminimum rate of10percent, them since most oftheir construction materials _.
asamended byPresidential Decree were imported. ,-
No. 34(October 1972) ,<
Presidential Decree No.474 instituted theMARINA which isanattached Theagency wastasked withacceterating the
Maritime Industry Decree agency oftheDepartment ofTransportation integration oftheentire maritime industry.
Maritime Industry Authodly(MARlNA) andCommunications (DOTC).
(01June 1974)
Philippine Merchent Marine Rules Governs therules regarding theconstruction Law isbased onU.S.Coast Guard Rules and
andRegulations (PMMRR) ofw,ssels inthecountry toensure that American Bureau ofShipping Rules which
vessels meet thehighest standards of arenotsuited forPhilippine purposes.
safety. Requires passenger vessels Atpresent, thetaw isbeing revised. •
tobedrydocked annually andforcargo ,.o
ships tobedrydocked once every 2years, o,Appe_iix2conUnued :o ,0;,
BOI1973 lO-Year Shipping Program Foreign consultants were hired toassess Theprogram came upwithplansto ,t,,
(February 1973) thestate oftheindustry. Theprogram integrate thefour sectors ofthemaritime
established theShipping Fund through the industry.
Development Bank ofthePhilippines (DBP).
Presidential Decree No.666 Provided incentives totheindustry even if Helped tremendously thesmall shipyards
(05March 1975) they were notregistered withBOI,solong whohaddifficulty acquiring support from
asthey were licensed byMARINA. BOI.
1977 Central Bank Circular Importation ofships andboats required
approval from theCentral Bank, butthose
ships which fallunder thecapacity ofthe
local shipyards were restricted.
Presidential Decree No. 1059 Tasked theMARINA withregulating the
operations oftheSE_SR industry.
Presidential Decree No.12.21 Required allPhilippine-owned orregistered Thelawwould have ensured acaptured
(17October 1977) vessels toundertake repairs anddrydocking market fortheSB/SP, industry butthe m









1981 Tariff Reform Program Revised thetariff rates for theimportation Refer toAppendices 5and6fordetails. 3D
(TRP) ofvessels toIhe10to50percent range ,D "O
overa 5-year period. _-
CL
1981Import Ubaralization Program Aimed fortheremoval ofquantitative Shelved because oftheforeign oo




P.D. No.1955 Cancellation of P.D. 666 Theincrease inoperating costs forthesmall 5
(15October 1984) shipyards adversely affected their operations. ,-_-
CO
MarinaMemo Circular (MC)No. 32 Restored theincentives under P.D. 666 TheSB/SR were again given incentives '<
FIRBResolution No.3-86 formeriy granted totheindustry, suchas tax-f_ importation ofrawmaterials.
(_ February 1986)
MarinaMCNo. 25-D Revised theagelimitation (vessels must Totally restricted theimportation of
(01July1986) be<15years)and other guidelines in pleasure cralts andbarges.
theimportation orbareboat charter of
inter-island vessels.
Import Uberalization Program Phase Removed thequantitative restrictions Approval fromCentral Bank isnolonger •
(Apd11986- Aprit 1988) ontheimportation ofpleasure required when importing pleasure crafts. ©
C8Circular 1109 (18Juty 1986) crafts and yachts. -._Appendix 2 cor#nued ©
Co
Executive Order No.93 Cancelled FIRB Resolution No3-86. Once again, theincentives wereremoved •
which took effect only onMarch 10, causing theoperating costs ofshipyards to
1987asperdepartment order No. surge.
44-87 oftheDepartment ofFinance
(17December 1986)
Executive Order No. 228 Incentives were still afforded to Only thelarge firms intheindustry were
(1987Omnibus Investments Code) SB/SR firms who wereregistered withBOt able toenjoy these incentives.
BOIIncentives (1989) Granted pioneer status to This effectively limited theavailment of
SB/SR firmswith capacities of10,000 incentives tothelargeshipyards inthe
andabove, country.
Import Uberalization Program Phase II Newvess_s can nowbe (Refer toTable 7fordetails)
(December, 1988- ) imparted Without anylimit on Certain items arestill subject to
C8Circular No. 1210 thequantity ofsuch watercrafts, regulation andareincluded inthe




Executive Order 125 Required small shipbuilders/repairers Although thelaw wasimplemented to
Marina MCNo.55 licenses from MARINA orelse pay aline reduce thenumber ofshipyards operating _:
Guidelines fortheLegalization ofPt,?.5,000._. without license, only eight colorum shipyards =_'
Q.




National Emergency Memo No. 8 Modified thetariff rates forcertain Thesector benefited from thereduction inthe c_
(26January t990) inputs oftheindustry, tariff rates oftheir material inputs.
t_
t991Tariff Reform Program Further reduced thetariff rates on -o
(E.O.470) imported water vessels. _
CL
Memo Order No. 363 Approved the1991Investment Priorities.Plan _o
(1991) ofBOI which granted pioneer/non-pioneer o
status totheSB/SR Industry. ,-5_
t-_
SenateBillssupportingtheindustry _0
Senate Bill774 Exempts from import duties andtaxes Currently I_e]ng discussed intheSenate although n 5-
Shipbuilding andShipRepair Industry theimportation ofmachinery, equipment and nosubstantial developments areforthcoming. =
Incenl_ves Act of1992 materials for theSB/SR industry. "<
Sources:PdicyandPlanning Divisbn,Marina.
"DBPS_Jdy onShipping andShipRepe_" Industry:lggO.
TariffsandCustomsCode#the Ph//ipp/ne$, 1_6 and1991.




Government Policies Affecting theShipping Industry •
Shipping Policies andLaws Descdption Remarks
Presidential Decree No.215 Exempts Riipinos whoimportocean-
(16June1973) going vessels fromthe10percent
customs dutyand7percent compensating tax.
Presidential Decree No.667 Grants additionat deductible items for
(05March1975) incometaxpurposes to indi_duals
whoimportships/vessels.
Presidential Decree No.760 Allowed thetemporary registration of
(3t July 1975) foreign-owned vessels (under apa_cular
timepedodorlease)toPhilippine na_onals
foruseindomestic ship_ng.
Presidential Decree No.806 Provides forseveral otherincentives rn o_




Bareboat Chartering Program Allowed Filipino entrepreneurs access to E
(1984) foreign-owned vessels tofurther their
businesses abroad, a
O
NAppendix 3 coMnued _
"0
Executive Order No. 226 Shipping firms can avail ofincentives like cr _c.
(1987Omnibus Inves_ents Code) impod taxexemption forcapital equipment and
domesSc tax credit for the acquisition of




MarinaMemo Circular No. 51 Requires allshipping lines which wish to Datafrom theManna reveal that asof1993, _,
avail olincenlJves under E,O. 226toget 18vessels have been purchased n
accreditation from theMarina. through EONo. 226. o m
_c.
Republic ActNo. 6647 Reduced theimport duties andtaxes on _-
(February 1988) vessels from 70to20percent 5 r_
with certain age andsizerequirements 5-
setbyMarina. Q= 0')
Marina Memo Circular No. 71 Defined theimplementing guidelines $impJified therules governing theentry
(22October 1992) ontheregulation ofthewater transport andexitoffirms into theindustry, rates
servfces pursuant toDOTC Dept. andfare setting andother provisions which
Order No.92-587. might leadtoamore competitive industry.
Marina Memo Circular No. 25-E Required allpassenger, cargo-passenger
(23November 1992) andterry vessels belonging totheexisting
inter-island fleet tobeclassed byany
internationally recognized classification society.
Sources:Policy andPl_mning Division, Marina;DSPStudy onShipping andShip Repair Induslry, 1990;PDCP Sludy ontheShipbui_iing and Ship Repair lndustq, '1972.
._e,102 4 EdwinGilQ Mendoza
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Appendix 4
Recipients ofBoard ofInvestments Incentives: 1967-1991
Date Firms Permit MarketRegistration
Registered Status Orientation Law
01/24/72 Cebu Shipyard &Engineering Non-pioneer Domestic RA5186
Works, Inc.
07/17/72 Philippine ironConstruction. Pioneer Domestic RA5186
andMarine Works
04/11/75 Sandoval Shipyard, Inc. Non.pioneer Domestic RA5186
11/10/75 Keppel (Philippines) Non-pioneer Domestic RA5186
Shipyard, inc.
07/20/90 Non.pioneer Export EO226
01/05/76 AG&PBatangas Marine Non.pioneer Domestic RA5186
andFabrication Yard




01/28/82 Philippine Aerospace Pioneer Domestic PD1789
Development Corp.
11/04/87 Philippine AJrcraft Co.,Inc. Non-pioneer Export EO226
01/14/88 Aviation Composite Tesh Non-pioneer Export EO226
07/18/88 TSlShip&Yacht Builders, Inc. Non-pioneer Export EO226
07/21/89 PADACO Marine Works and Non-pioneer Domestic EO226
Shipbuilding Corp.
07/26/£9 Mayon Docks, Inc. Pioneer Domestic EO226
Source:_oardof Investments,
III I I I IIShipbuilding/R_pair and Boatlouilding Industry IP.103
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Appendix 5
Tariff Rates fortheShipbuilding/Repair Subsector: 1972-1995
Rate ofDuLy (%)
Description 1972 1978 1981 1983 1988 1991 1993 1995
Output
Ships
1 Tankers 25 20 30 30 30 3 3 3
2 Other vessels for
goods andpassenger 25 20 30 30 30 6 6 6
3 Fishing vessels 25 20 30 30 " 30 6 6 6
40therships andboats 15 15 30 30 30 6 6 6
Average 22.5018.7530.0030.0030.00 5,25 5.25 5.25
Inputs
Ironandsteel
1 Alloy pigiron 0 lO 5 5 5 3 3 3
2 Other bars androds
ofiron ornon-alloy steel
not further worked then
forged, hot-rolled 0 0 20 20 20 10 10 10
3 Angles, shapes andsections
ofiron ornon .alloy steel
(average tariff) 80 70 20 20 20 15 15 15
4 Wireofironornon-alloy
steel(average tariffs) -. 0 0 10 10 10 30 30 30
5 Wireofotheralloy steel 0 20 10 10 10 10 10 10
6 Sheet piling ofiron
orsteel 100 50 50 30 20 20 20 20
7 Stranded wire,ropes
andcables 30 20 10 10 10 10 10 10
8 I_rbedwireofiron
o_steel 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
9 Anchors, grapnels and
parts thereof of
iron andsteel 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10104 4 EdwinGilQ,Mendoza
Appendix 5continued
Rate of Duty (%)




ironorsteel 50 50 10 10 10 30 30 30
11Springs ofironandsteel 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
12Other articles ofiron
orsteel 50 50 60 40 40 40 35 30
13Ships rudders ofsteel 0 0 30 30 30 10 10 10
Average 28.4625.3822.6919.6218.8519.0818.6918.31
Outfitting metals
1 Refined copper and
copper alloys 10 10 10 10 10 3 3 3
2 Copper bars,rods
andprofiles 10 10 20 20 20 30 20 20
3 Aluminum 15 15 20 20 20 30 30 30
Average 11.6711.6716.6716.6716.6721.0017.6717.67
Machineries
1 Marine propulsion engines 10 10 10 20 20 20 10 10
2 Other engines 10 10 10 20 20 20 10 10
3 Partsofengines 10 10 10 20 20 20 10 10
4 Other engines andmotors
includes turbo-propellers,
reaction engines, and 10 10 10 10 20 20 10 10
parts
Average 10 10 10 17.5 20 20 10 10
Electrical equipment
1 Motors andgenerators 30 30 20 20 20 25 15 15Shipbuilding/Repair and Boa_building Industry I_ 105
Appendix 5 continued
Rate of Duty(%)
Description 1972 1978 1981 1983 1988 1991 1993 1998
2 Other transformers 50 50 30 30 30 20 20 20
3 Primary cells and 50 50 40 30 30 30 30 30
batteries
4 Electrical starting and
ignition equipment for
internal combustion
engines 30 30 30 30 30 10 10 10
5 Transmission ,tpparatus
fornavigation,'d use 100 100 80 60 50 10 10 10
6 Electrical wirings 30 30 20 20 20 10 10 10
Average 48.3348.3336.6731.6730,0017.5015.83 15.83
Paints andvarnishes
1 Water-thinned,paints130 100 70 40 40 40 30 30
2 Other paints orenamels;
varnishes 100 100 70 40 40 40 40 30
3 Pigments inp,_int or
enamel media 0 0 70 40 40 20 20 20
Average 76.8766.6770.5040.0040.5033.3330.0026.67
Others
I Cement 50 50 50 50 40 50 30 30




Source: Taziffand Customs Code of the Phllipp_es, 1972, 1978, 1982, 1991.
i i I I I IAppendix 6
Tariff Rates fortheBoatbuilding Subsector: 1972-1995 ,_
RateofDuty (%)
Descdption 1972 1978 1981 1983 1986 1988 1991 1993 1995
Output
Boats (Pleasure/Sports)
1 Yachts andpleasure boats 25 30 37 37 37 37 50 40 30
Input
Wood
1 Fibre building board ofwood 100 50 60 40 30 30 50 40 30
2 Plywood 100 50 40 40 40 40 50 50 50
3 =Improved" wood,
insheets orblocks 1C0 50 40 40 40 40 30 30 30
Paints andvamishes
1 Water-thinned paints 130 100 70 40 40 40 40 30 30 5
° 2 Other paints orenamels;
varnishes 100 100 70 40 40 40 40 40 40 o
3 Pigments inpaint or z_






Rate ofDuty(%) -= Q.
Description 1972 1978 1981 1983 1986 1988 1991 1993 1995 5-
(II
Ironandsteel 2.
10Screws, bolts, nuts, washers,
rivets andsimilar articles o_
ofironorsteel 50 50 10 10 10 10 30 30 30 m
0
11Spnngs ofiron andsteel 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 _:
12Other articles ofironorsteel 50 50 60 40 40 40 40 35 30 c
Q..
14Rails 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2.0 20 5
r_Q
Resin andfiberglass cL (--
1 Condensation and
potycondensation products 60 50 40 30 25 25 20 20 20 '<
2 Natural resins andartificial
resins obtained bynatural means40 40 35 30 25 25 20 20 20
3 Other artificial resins 50 50 50 40 30 30 20 20 20
4 Fiberglass 70 50 50 40 30 30 20 20 20
Average 64.2 49.2 46.0 34.2 31.4 31.4 30.7 28.9 27.8
Source: TariffandCustomsCodeof thePh_ippines, 1972,1978,1982,1991.
V
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5. Trawlers andotherfishingvessels;factoryshipsusedin fishing-related operations,
used
Restrictions areImposed forreasons ofsafety andquality.
Source: Central Bank ofthe Philippines,
lllll Ill _ ......CO
Appendix 8
Imports ofShips: 1977-1991 _-_
1977 1978 1979 1980
Commodity Oty CIFValueOly CIFValueOly CIFValue Qty CIFValue _o
Used
Tankers 2 1,765,965 1 398,450 3 3,283,058 7 32,936,370 o. _o
Barges I 14,970 0 0 0 0 2 780,500 o m
Other cargo andpassenger ships 24 1,934,884 38 39,349,499 33 39,381,147 40 59,832,976
Trawlers andI_shing vessels 27 2,035,459 24 4,737,124 34 9,847,504 41 3,348,245
Subtotal 54 5,751,278 63 44,465,073 70 52,511,709 90 96,898,091
New
Tankers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
rj)
Barges 0 0 2 696,450 0 0 2 24,663,788 ,._
Other cargo andpassenger ships 3 25,481,823 1 3,951,750 2 221,272 0 0
Trawlers andfishing vessels 0 0 1 58,000 0 0 5 736,000
Subtotal 3 25,481,823 4 4,706,200 2 221,272 7 25,399,788
Ships notelsewhere classified
Ships from 250to3,000 gross tonnage 3 2,968,957 0 0 1 4,500,000 1 200,000
Ships more than 3,000 gross tonnage 2 3,400,670 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ships less than 250gross tonnage 1 40,045 3 422,298 20 77,064 5 113,099
Subtotal 6 6,409,672 3 422,298 21 4,577,064 6 313,099
Total 63 37,642,773 70 49,613,571 93 57,310,045103 122,610,978
r,DAppendix8 continued o
1981 1982 1983 1984. • ""
Commodity Oty ClFValue Qty ClFValue Oty CIFValue Oty CIFValue
Used
Tankers 1. 6,200,000 0 0 0 0 1 709,622
Barges 0 0 1 122,976 2 390,690 0 0
Othercargoandpassenger ships 25 29,938,426 15 t0,760,310 14 8,445,127 4 -585,984
Trawlers and fishingvessels 56 11,345,794 17 654,4931 23 699,367 24 295,957
Subtotal 82 47,484,220 33 17,428,217 39 9,535,184 29 1,591,563
New
Tankers 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 549,837
Barges 1 44,186 0 0 0 0 0 0
0thercargoandpassenger ships 3 30,817,044 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trawlers andfishingvessels 1 375r000 1 3,758,655 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 5 31,236,230 1 3,758,655 0 0 1 549,837
Shipsnotelsewhereclassified
Shipsfrom250to3,000grosstonnage 1 3,t45,928 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shipsmorethan3,000grosstonnage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 m c'_
Shipslessthan250grosstonnage 5 10,878 6 81,983 1 62,437 4 8,948,261 _.
Subtotal 6 3,156,806 6 81,983 1 62,437 4 81948,261







1985 1986 1987 1988
Commodity Qty CIFValueOty CIFValueQty CIFValue Oty ClFValue ¢_=
(13
Used
Tankers 0 0 1 72,000 2 400,000 1 1,210,000
Barges 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = o_
Olhercargo andpassenger ships 2 201,026 6 760,770 16 2,539,082 11 7,804,141 m o
Trawlers andfishing vessels 52 1,015,154 37 95,6853 27 • 727,002 20 589,188
Subtotaf 54 1,216,180 44 1,789,623 45 3,666,084 32 9,603,329 ___.
New
Tankers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barges 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • _. EE
Othercargo andpassenger ships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 557
Trawlers andfishing vessels 0 0 8 2,900,118 0 0 0 0 '<
Subtotal 0 0 8 2,900,118 0 0 1 557
Shipsnotelsewhere classified
Shipsfrom 250to3,000 gross tonnage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ships more than 3,000 gross tonnage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ships lessthan 250gross tonnage 0 0 1 23,374 2 82,174 7 174,285
Subtotal 0 0 1 23,374 2 82,174 7 174,285





Commodity Qty ClFValue Qty ClFValue Qty CiFValue
Used
•Tankers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barges 1 119,340 0 0 0 0
Other cargo andpassenger ships 7 5375920 12 1,356,789 2 481,500
Trawlers andfishing vessels 6 105,764 24 2,031,911 15 11,165,324
Subtotal 14 5,601,024 36 3,388,700 17 11,646,824
New
Tankers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barges 0 0 .0 0 0 0
Other cargo andpassenger ships 0 0 0 0 1 6168
Trawlers andfishing vessels 0 0 0 0 4 720,025
Subtotal 0 0 0 0 5 726,193
Shipsnotelsewhere classified
Ships from 250to3,000 gross tonnage 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ships more than 3,000 gross tonnage 0 0 0 0 0 0 rn
O..
Ships lessthan250gross tonnage 3 2,820 0 0 2 7,000 -_.
Subtotal 3 2,820 0 0 2 7,000
Total 17 5,603,844 36 3,388,700 24 12,380,017
E).




Exports ofShips: 1977-1992 _ =
if)
1977 1978 1979 1980 "o
_.
Commodity Oty ClFValueOty CIFValueOty CIFValue Oly CIFValue _,
£Z
Used m
Tankers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o
Barges 2 190,710 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other cargo andpassenger ships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 323,642
Trawlers andIfshing vessels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 2 190,710 0 0 0 0 1 323,642 __
t.-
New
Tankers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 <
Barges 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 548,765
Other cargo andpassenger ships 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trawlers andfishing vessels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 548,765
Ships notelsewhere das_ied
From 250to3,000 gross tonnage 1 1,686 3 1,919,000 0 0 5 0
More than3,0_ gross tonnage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Less than 250gross tonnage 2 15,111 3 5,700 33 20,629 13 69,150
Subtotal 3 16,797 6 1,924,700 33 20,629 18 74,056 •
Total 5 207,507 6 1,924_700 33 20,629 20 946,463 __Appendix 9continued ,=
1981 1982 1983 1984
Commodity Oty CIFValueQty CiFValue Qty CIFValue Qty CIFValue
Used
Tankers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barges 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other cargo and passenger ships 0 "0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trawlers andfishing vessels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0
Subtotal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New
Tankers t 137,460 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barges 1 868,t 17 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other cargoandpassenger ships 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trawlers andfishing vessels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 2 1,005,577 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ships notelsewhere classified rn
From 250to3,000 gross tonnage 2 7,800 0 0 0 0 0 0
Morethan 3,000 gross tonnage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 =
Less than250gross tonnage 13 257,586 12 408,644 14- 60,455 1 38,658
Subtotal t5 265,386 12 408,644 14 60,455 1 38,658 c)










Appendix 9continued _ _o
O_
1985 1986 1987 1988 0
Commodity Oty ClFValueOty CtFValueOty ClFValue Oty CIFValue
(-
Used
Tankers, barges, etc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New D.
Tankers, barges, etc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shipsnotelsewhere classified
From 250to3,000 gross tonnage 3 329,254 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than3,000 grosstonnage 1 125,000 0 0 1 443,609 0 0
Lessthan 250gross tonnage 1 17,482 0 0 0 0 1 4,630
Subtotal 5 471,736 0 0 1 443,609 1 4,6;30
Total 5 471,736 0 0 1 443,609 1 4,630
0"1Appendix 9continued
1989 1990 1991 1992
Commodity Oty ClFValueOty ClFVatueOty ClFVatue Oty CIFValue
Used
Tankers, barges, etc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New
Tankers, barges, etc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ships notelsewhere classified
From 250to3,000 gross tonnage 1 10,887 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than3,000 gross tonnage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lessthan250gross tonnage 1 15,738 2 1,873 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 2 26,625 2 t,873 0 0 0 0
Total 2 26,625 2 1,873 0 0 0 0







Exports ofPleasure boats: 1977-1992 ,: _.
_..
1977 1978 1979 1980




forpleasure orsports 24 338,550 40 459,589 49 765,109 24 21,064 o.
03
0
1981 1982 1983 1984 E_
t,-
Qty. CIF Value Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIF Value Qty. CIFValue
"1
(,Q
38 449,467 44 759,737 52 691,312 16 461,847 _.
r-_
¢-.
1985 1986 1987 1988
Qty. CiFValue Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIF Value Qty. ClFValue
27 190,123 t3 392,304 15 63,909 7. 234,951
1989 1990 1991 1992
Qty. CIFValue Qty. ClFValue Qty. CIFValue Qty. CJF Value
8 221,566 25 495,933 41 117,895 1 4,020






imports of PleasureBoats: 1977-1991 •
1977 1978 1979 1980
Commodity Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue
Yachtsandothervessels
forpleasureorsports 15 125,868 12 40,795 30 521,145 24 21,064
1981 1982 1983 1984
Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue Qty. ClFValue Qty. CIFValue
6 201,118 10 23,491 9 33,087 5 25,029
1985 1986 1987 1988
Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue
2 8,890 2 2,8T7 11 230,250 29 301,078
1989 1990 1991 rn
EL
Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue Qty. CIFValue __.
72 219,085 39 95,986 " 116 285,406
o
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Appendix 12
TariffRates andOtherVariables Used in DRC-EPR andTElEstimations
Boatbuilding Shipbuilding andRepair
1983 1986 1988 1991 1983 1986 1988 1991
Sales taxes* (%)
Outputj 10.00 20.00 10.00 10,00 10.00 20.00 10.00 10.00
Inputs i 10.00 20.00 10,00 10,00 10.00 20.00 10.00 10.00
Import mark-up 25,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Assets 10,00 20.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 20.00 10.00 10.00
Nominal tariffrates (%)
Output j 37.00 37.00 37.00 50.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 6.50
Inputs i 27.88 22,87 22,87 16.26 15.70 15.60 15.60 15.40
Implicittariffrates(%)
Outputj 53.75 64.00 50.34 65.00 45,13 54.80 41.90 17.15
Inputs i 43.87 47.45 35.16 27.89 30.00 38.69 27.00 26.65
Machinery and
equipment 57.22 42.93 30.93 28.81 57.22 42.93 30.93 28.81
Other fixedasset_ -- 76.00 61.70 61.00 -- 76.00 61.70 61.00
Transportation
equipment 63.24 45.00 42.00 26.00 63.24 45.00 42.00 26.00
Estimated useful life
ofassets(inyears)
Buildings 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Production machinery
andequipment 20 20 20 20 25 20 25 20
Office equipment
andother supplies 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Transportation
equipment 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Shadow pdcefactors
Labor (%) 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Capital interest _te(%)10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Foreign exchange
(inpesoterms) 13,89 27.99 26.37 33.59 13,89 27.99 26.37 33.59120 4 EdwinGilQ Mendoza
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Boatbuilding Shipbuilding andRepair
1983 1986 1968 1991 1983 1986 1988 1991
Other constants
Official exchange rate
(inpesoterms) 11.11 22.39 21.09 26.87 11.11 22.39 21.09 26.87
Export-output
ratio(%) 16.00 + 16.00 + 4.00 + 4.00 +
Ratio ofimported




1983 only) 23.49 -- -- -- 92.00 -- -- --
Minimum wage
rates
(inpesoterms) 34.22 57.08 69.33127.83 34.22 57.08 69.33127.83
Allocation RaUos fortheAssets forAllYears
(Inpercent)




Production machinery andequipment 100 15 85
Other fixed assets 85 15 100
Transportation equipment 80 20 15 85
Inventories
Material inputs 85 15

















Costofindustrial services donebyothers 100
Costof non-industrial services donebyothers 100
Subsidies 100
+ Figures reporte_ byfirms inthesurvey were used.
* Advance sales taxes ,,,re equivalent tothedomestic sales taxes.
Sources: TariffanoCustomsCodeofthe Philippines, 1983,1986,1988,1991 .TariffCommission,
NationalfntemalRevenueCode,1983,1986,1988,1991.
TariffCommission-PIOS Working PaperNo.86-13
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Appendix 13
Price Indices Used inDRCComputations
(1972=100)
Assets
Year Buildings* Machines Transport OtherFixed Assets
Equipment
1930 33.31 17.10 17.10 48,07
1931 33.90 17.42 17.42 48.92
1932 34.51 17.75 17,75 49,81
1933 35,14 18,09 18.09 50, 73
1934 35,80 18,45 18,45 51.68
1935 36.48 18,82 18,82 52,67
1936 37,19 19.21 19.21 53,70
1937 37.92 19.61 19,61 54,77
1938 38.68 20.04 20.04 55.88
1939 39.48 20.47 20.47 57,04
1940 40.31 20.93 20.93 58,25
1941 41.17 21,41 21,41 59,51
1942 42.07 21,92 21.92 60.82
1943 43,02 22,44 22,44 62,20
1944 44,00 23,00 23,O0 63,64
1945 45.03 23,58 23.58 65,15
1946 52.95 24,19 24.19 66.73
1947 53.09 24,83 24.83 68.39
1948 53.46 25.51 25.51 70.13
1949 54.34 26.23 26.23 71.97
1950 59,39 26.99 26.99 73.90
1951 56.10 27,79 27,79 75, 94
1952 55.88 28.64 28.64 78,10
1953 56.83 29.55 29,55 80.38
1954 54,78 30.51 30.51 82,80
1955 54.85 31.54 31.54 85.37
1956 55, 58 32,65 32,65 88,11
1957 56.02 33.83 33.83 91.03
1958 56.76 35.10 35,10 94.14
1959 58.22 31.24 31.24 97.48
1960 62.32 33,23 33,23 101,06
1961 62,54 35,06 35,06 104, 92Shipbuilding/Repair and Boatbuilding industry I_ 123
Appendix13continued
Assets
Year Buildings* Machines Transport OtherFixedAssets
Equipment
1962 66.20 37,35 37.35 109.08
1963 69.57 40,85 40.85 113.59
1964 71,48 42.95 42.95 118.48
1965 73,16 46.43 46.43 123,82
1966 76.67 50.53 50.53 129.66
1967 78.58 55.42 55.42 136.07
1968 85.24 61.35 61.35 117.28
1969 88.54 68.71 68.71 127,71
1970 84.15 80.14 80.14 84.89
1971 93,42 92,85 92.85 94.11
1972 100,00 100.00 100,00 100,00
1973 120,16 109.70 109.70 116.55
1974 189,29 136,45 136,45 173.15
1975 190.41 158.82 158.82 197.45
1976 205.54 172,62 172.62 215.60
1977 221,59 180,50 180.50 225.75
1978 240,66 196.78 196.78 248.50
1979 290.86 218.90 218.90 276.50
1980 335.97 241.00 241.00 332.70
1981 382.09 262.03 262.03 365.10
1982 410.35 297,29 297,29 391.46
1983 457,02 331.96 331.96 466.00
_1984 670.08 525,04 525,04 735.59
1985 732.33 671,36 671,38 779.23
1986 759,42 712,23 712.23 799.55
1987 837.86 751,43 751,43 875,70




* Construction Price Index
Sources /VEDA Statis tical Yearbooks 1985-1992, National Economic and Development Authority,
TariffCommission-PIDS Staff Paper Series No,98
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